YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED: The Situation In The Markets Is Much Worse Than You Realize

11 09 2017

Reblogged from the SRS website……. between this item and Raul’s which I posted yesterday, I’d say the US economy has to hit the wall very soon now. Hang onto your seats folks….


It’s about time that I share with you all a little secret.  The situation in the markets is much worse than you realize.  While that may sound like someone who has been crying “wolf” for the past several years, in all honesty, the public has no idea just how dire our present situation has become.

The amount of debt, leverage, deceit, corruption, and fraud in the economic markets, financial system, and in the energy industry are off the charts.  Unfortunately, the present condition is even much worse when we consider “INSIDER INFORMATION.”

What do I mean by insider information… I will explain that in a minute.  However, I receive a lot of comments on my site and emails stating that the U.S. Dollar is A-okay and our domestic oil industry will continue pumping out cheap oil for quite some time.  They say… “No need to worry.  Business, as usual, will continue for the next 2-3 decades.”

I really wish that were true.  Believe me, when I say this, I am not rooting for a collapse or breakdown of our economic and financial markets.  However, the information, data, and facts that I have come across suggest that the U.S. and global economy will hit a brick wall within the next few years.

How I Acquire My Information, Data & Facts

To put out the original information in my articles and reports, I spend a great deal of time researching the internet on official websites, alternative media outlets, and various blogs.  Some of the blogs that I read, I find more interesting information in the comment section than in the article.  For example, the site is visited by a lot of engineers and geologists in the oil and gas industry.  Their comments provide important “on-hands insight” in the energy sector not found on the Mainstream Media.

I also have a lot of contacts in the various industries that either forward information via email or share during phone conversations.  Some of the information that I receive from these contacts, I include in my articles and reports.  However, there is a good bit of information that I can’t share, because it was done with the understanding that I would not reveal the source or intelligence.

Of course, some readers may find that a bit cryptic, but it’s the truth.  Individuals have contacted me from all over the world and in different levels of industry and business.  Some people are the working staff who understand th reality taking place in the plant or field, while others are higher ranking officers.  Even though I have been receiving this sort of contact for the past 4-5 years, the number has increased significantly over the past year and a half.

That being said, these individuals contacted me after coming across my site because they wanted to share valuable information and their insight of what was going on in their respective industries.  The common theme from most of these contacts was…. GOSH STEVE, IT’S MUCH WORSE THAN YOU REALIZE.  Yes, that is what I heard over and over again.

If my readers and followers believe I am overly pessimistic or cynical, your hair will stand up on your neck if you knew just how bad the situation was BEHIND THE SCENES.

Unfortunately, we in the Alternative Media have been lobotomized to a certain degree due to the constant propaganda from the Mainstream Media and market intervention by the Fed and Central Banks.  A perfect example of the massive market rigging is found in Zerohedge’s recent article;Central Banks Have Purchased $2 Trillion In Assets In 2017 :

….. so far in 2017 there has been $1.96 trillion of central bank purchases of financial assets in 2017 alone, as central bank balance sheets have grown by $11.26 trillion since Lehman to $15.6 trillion.

What is interesting about the nearly $2 trillion in Central Bank purchases so far in 2017, is that the average for each year was only $1.5 trillion.  We can plainly see that the Central Banks had to ramp up asset purchases as the Ponzi Scheme seems to be getting out of hand.

So, how bad is the current economic and financial situation in the world today?  If we take a look at the chart in the next section, it may give you a clue.

THE DEATH OF BEAR STEARNS: A Warning For Things To Come

It seems like a lot of people already forgot about the gut-wrenching 2008-2009 economic and financial crash.  During the U.S. Banking collapse, two of the country’s largest investment banks, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns went belly up.  Lehman Brothers was founded in 1850 and Bear Stearns in 1923.  In just one year, both of those top Wall Street Investment Banks ceased to exist.

Now, during the 2001-2007 U.S. housing boom heyday, it seemed like virtually no one had a clue just how rotten a company Bear Stearns had become.  Looking at the chart below, we can see the incredible RISE & FALL of Bear Stearns:

As Bear Stearns added more and more crappy MBS – Mortgage Backed Securities to its portfolio, the company share price rose towards the heavens.  At the beginning of 2007 and the peak of the U.S. housing boom, Bear Stearns stock price hit a record $171.  Unfortunately, at some point, all highly leveraged garbage assets or Ponzi Schemes come to an end.  While the PARTY LIFE at Bear Stearns lasted for quite a while, DEATH came suddenly.

In just a little more than a year, Bear Stearns stock fell to a mere $2… a staggering 98% decline.  Of course, the financial networks and analysts were providing guidance and forecasts that Bear Stearns was a fine and healthy company.  For example, when Bear was dealing with some negative issues in March 2008,  CBNC’s Mad Money, Jim Cramer made the following statement in response to a caller on his show (Source):

Tuesday, March 11, 2008, On Mad Money

Dear Jim: “Should I be worried about Bear Stearns in terms of liquidity and get my money out of there?” – Peter

Jim Cramer: “No! No! No! Bear Stearns is fine. Do not take your money out. Bear sterns is not in trouble. If anything, they’re more likely to be taken over. Don’t move your money from Bear. That’s just being silly. Don’t be silly.”

Thanks to Jim, many investors took his advice.  So, what happened to Bear Stearns after Jim Cramer gave the company a clean bill of health?

On Tuesday, March 11, the price of Bear Stearns was trading at $60, but five days later it was down 85%.  The source (linked above) where I found the quote in which Jim Cramer provided his financial advice, said that there was a chance Jim was replying to the person in regards to the money he had deposited in the bank and not as an investment.  However, Jim was not clear in stating whether he was talking about bank deposits or the company health and stock price.

Regardless, Bear Stearns stock price was worth ZERO many years before it collapsed in 2008.  If financial analysts had seriously looked into the fundamentals in the Mortgage Backed Security market and the bank’s financial balance sheet several years before 2008, they would have realized Bear Stearns was rotten to the core.  But, this is the way of Wall Street and Central Banks.  Everything is fine, until the day it isn’t.

And that day is close at hand.

THE RECORD LOW VOLATILITY INDEX:  Signals Big Market Trouble Ahead

Even though I have presented a few charts on the VIX – Volatility Index in past articles, I thought this one would provide a better picture of the coming disaster in the U.S. stock markets:

The VIX – Volatility Index (RED) is shown to be at its lowest level ever when compared to the S&P 500 Index (GREY) which is at its all-time high.  If we take a look at the VIX Index in 2007, it fell to another extreme low right at the same time Bear Stearns stock price reached a new record high of $171.  Isn’t that a neat coincidence?

As a reminder, the VIX Index measures the amount of fear in the markets.  When the VIX Index is at a low, the market believes everything is A-OKAY.  However, when the VIX surges higher, then it means that fear and panic have over-taken investment sentiment, as blood runs in the streets.

As the Fed and Central Banks continue playing the game of Monopoly with Trillions of Dollars of money printing and asset purchases, the party won’t last for long as DEATH comes to all highly leveraged garbage assets and Ponzi Schemes.

To get an idea just how much worse the situation has become than we realize, let’s take a look at the energy fundamental that is gutting everything in its path.


Even though I belong to the Alternative Media Community, I am amazed at the lack of understanding by most of the precious metals analysts when it comes to energy.  While I respect what many of these gold and silver analysts have to say, they exclude the most important factor in their forecasts.  This critical factor is the Falling EROI – Energy Returned On Investment.

As I mentioned earlier in the article, I speak to many people on the phone from various industries.  Yesterday, I was fortunate enough to chat with Bedford Hill of the Hill’s Group for over 90 minutes.  What an interesting conversation.  Ole Bedford knows we are toast.  Unfortunately, only 0.01% of the population may understand the details of the Hill’s Group work.

Here is an explanation of the Hill’s Group:

The Hill’s Group is an association of consulting engineers and professional project managers. Our goal is to support our clients by providing them with the most relevant, and up to-date skill sets needed to manage their organizations. Depletion: A determination for the world’s petroleum reserve provides organizational long range planners, and policy makers with the essential information they will need in today’s rapidly changing environment.

I asked Bedford if he agreed with me that the hyperinflationary collapse of Venezuela was due to the falling oil price rather than its corrupt Communist Government.  He concurred.  Bedford stated that the total BTU energy cost to extract Venezuela’s heavy oil was higher than the BTU’s the market could afford.  Bedford went on to say that when the oil price was at $80, Venezuela could still make enough profit to continue running its inefficient, corrupt government.  However, now that the price of oil is trading below $50, it’s gutting the entire Venezuelan economy.

During our phone call, Bedford discussed his ETP Oil model, shown in his chart below.  If there is one chart that totally screws up the typical Austrian School of Economics student or follower, it’s this baby:

Bedford along with a group of engineers spent thousands and thousands of hours inputting the data that produced the “ETP Cost Curve” (BLACK LINE).  The ETP Cost Curve is the average cost to produce oil by the industry.  The RED dots represent the actual average annual West Texas Oil price.  As you can see, the oil price corresponded with the ETP Cost Curve.  This correlation suggests that the market price of oil is determined by its cost of production, rather than supply and demand market forces.

The ETP Cost Curve goes up until it reached an inflection point in 2012… then IT PEAKED.  The black line coming down on the right-hand side of the chart represents “Maximum Consumer Price.”  This line is the maximum price that the end consumer can afford.  Again, it has nothing to do with supply and demand rather, it has everything to do with the cost of production and the remaining net energy in the barrel of oil.

I decided to add the RED dots for years 2014-2016.  These additional annual oil price figures remain in or near the Maximum Consumer Price line.  According to Bedford, the oil price will continue lower by 2020.  However, the actual annual oil price in 2015 and 2016 was much lower than estimated figures Bedford, and his group had calculated.  Thus, we could see some volatility in the price over the next few years.

Regardless, the oil price trend will be lower.  And as the oil price continues to fall, it will gut the U.S. and global oil industry.  There is nothing the Fed and Central Banks can do to stop it.  Yes, it’s true that the U.S. government could step in and bail out the U.S. shale oil industry, but this would not be a long-term solution.

Why?  Let me explain with the following chart:

I have published this graph at least five times in my articles, but it is essential to understand.  This chart represents the amount of below investment grade debt due by the U.S. energy industry each year.  Not only does this debt rise to $200 billion by 2020, but it also represents that the quality of oil produced by the mighty U.S. shale oil industry WAS UNECONOMICAL even at $100 a barrel.

Furthermore, this massive amount of debt came from the stored economic energy via the various investors who provided the U.S. shale energy industry with the funds to continue producing oil at a loss.   We must remember, INVESTMENT is stored economic energy.  Thus, pension plans, mutual funds, insurance funds, etc., had taken investments gained over the years and gave it to the lousy U.S. shale oil industry for a short-term high yield.

Okay, this is very important to understand.  Don’t look at those bars in the chart above as money or debt, rather look at them as energy.  If you can do that, you will understand the terrible predicament we are facing.  Years ago, these large investors saved up capital that came from burning energy.  They took this stored economic energy (capital) and gave it to the U.S. shale oil industry.  Without that capital, the U.S. shale oil industry would have gone belly up years ago.

So, what does that mean?  It means… IT TOOK MORE ENERGY TO PRODUCE THE SHALE OIL than was DELIVERED TO THE MARKET.  Regrettably, the overwhelming majority of shale oil debt will never be repaid.  As the oil price continues to head lower, the supposed shale oil break-even price will be crushed.  Without profits, debts pile up even higher.

Do you all see what is going on here?  And let me say this.  What I have explained in this article, DOES NOT INCLUDE INSIDER INFORMATION, which suggests “The situation is even much worse than you realize… LOL.”

For all my followers who believe business, as usual, will continue for another 2-3 decades, YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED.  The energy situation is in far worse shape than you can imagine.


Three Things We Don’t Understand About Climate Change

3 09 2017

ANOTHER great article from Ahmed Nafeez’ new Medium website…….  Please support his magnificent efforts.

This is the most honest item on Climate Change I hace seen in quite a while. It almost goes as far as saying what I’ve now concluded, we must de-industrialise. Almost.

Go to the profile of Aarne Granlund
Aarne GranlundFollow



Thinking about climate change is not something that comes natural to humans — or ‘consumers’ as we have been called for decades. It is not only emotionally unpleasant, but analytically extremely challenging.

I argue that most of us do not grasp how immediate this situation has become, how fast it is progressing and what the scale of change needed is to reach the stabilisation targets of the Paris Agreement.

I also argue that after individuals, nations and corporations understand the urgency and the rate, they should be honest about the scale of action needed in order to avoid collapse of the biosphere and thus civilisation.

North America on 29th of August 2017. Tundra and forest fires in the Arctic + British Columbia and Hurricane Harvey off the coast of South Texas (Terra / MODIS @ Nasa WorldView).

Human society is deeply and permanently coupled to the Earth System. In the geological epoch we have entered called the Anthropocene, that system is undergoing immediate, massive disruption. The previous epoch of Holocene gave us agriculture and settled living arrangements.

Since the onset of industrial production at an accelerating rate and scale, human society has had deep and far ranging influence on natural processes which it depends on. Climate change is only one of the manifestations — there are multiple large-scale indicators of our presence on this planet from erosion to nitrogen runoff, species extinction to uncontrolled population growth.

1. Urgency

The first misunderstanding about climate change is related to how we perceive its impacts in the temporal space. It is not (only) a future issue, not a polar bear issue and certainly not an issue which only affects a few remote parts of the world.

Situation has become dangerous during the last three years of 2014, 2015, 2016 and now continuing into 2017. Certain parts of the world see less immediate danger but systematic changes affect us all.

NASA GISS dataset on land and ocean temperature anomalies (2017).

How is it possible that the Earth System has taken up our presence on the surface so lightly even when we have changed the chemistry of the atmosphere and the ocean with our carbon pollution?

Ocean heat uptake has doubled since 1997 (Gleckler et al, 2016).

Most of the energy (heat) human carbon pollution creates ends up warming the world ocean, some 93% of our pyromania ends up there. Every passing year we pump 41 gigatons (that is a very big number) of carbon dioxide into the Earth System, where roughly half of it is absorbed by natural sink capabilities of the ocean and the land biosphere. Rest of it ends up in the atmosphere with all the other gases we put up, including aerosols and certain novel entities that have never occured in the natural state of the Earth System.

The fact that increasing greenhouse gas loading from human sources in the carbon cycle is cumulative makes this an extremely vicious political, economic and social problem. The increment which ends up in the atmosphere can only be drawn down by the natural climate system on time scales extending to tens or hundreds of thousands of years.

The Global Carbon Budget from GCP, 2017.

One component of urgency is that when surface temperatures increase after being buffered by the ocean — without the world ocean we would already be 36°C hotter on the surface of continents from the increased atmospheric forcing — they can do so in a non-linear fashion.

This creates immediate impacts. Single exceptional extreme weather events are not caused by climate change but happen in a distinctively new climate. Hotter atmosphere holds more moisture which increases precipitation. Extreme heatwaves become more common. Ice in all its forms melts.

Right now there are multiple imminent disasters occuring in various parts of the planet. Global fire situation has been exceptional in Siberia, Greenland, Canada and in other parts of North America. Tundra burns, forests burn, people suffer. Europe has been under severe heat waves and there have been mass casualties from forest fires in Portugal.

There is extreme flooding in South Asia, impacting multiple cities and the country of Bangladesh of which one third is currently under water. Hurricane Harvey just hit South Texas at Category 4 strength and produced record precipitation totals for many locations, including but not limited to the City of Houston. Tens of millions suffer from these impacts — right now.

Arctic climate change is proceeding at fast pace (AMAP SWIPA, 2017

2. Rate and Scale of Change

The Arctic, area located on the top of the planet from 66°N north, is a prime example of systematic exponential change. It is warming at least twice as fast as the rest of the planet. There is less inertia in the Arctic than there is in the general climate system.

But even the general climate system is being pushed in ways which have no previous analogue in natural climate changes going back tens of millions of years. It is about the rate of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases added. There have been periods in the deep geological past of Earth when greenhouse gas concentrations have been much, much higher than they are today but increases have never occured this rapidly.

Proxy measurements of carbon dioxide from ice cores (NOAA @ NASA Climate Change

Earth is a fluid, non-linear system capable of abrupt and total change. Earth System has been in a hothouse state and for a while was mostly covered by ice. At current pathways we are literally going to lose very large portions of both continental polar ice sheets, possibly in their entirety. This will take centuries but when we commit, the result will be permanent. Permafrost is thawing, threathening both the carbon cycle and our settled living arrangements in the Arctic.

When climate scientists project future climate change up to and beyond 2050 and 2100 they refer to scenarios. They are used in policy making to set stabilisation targets.

Tipping elements in the climate system (Schellnhuber et al, 2015).

What is worrying is that humanity is currently putting in place an atmospheric forcing comparable to something between the RCP4.5 and 8.5 (watts per square meter) end results. The choice between the Paris Agreement ‘well below 2°C’ framing and higher, 3–4°C level of warming is the choice of having a civilisation with global governance capability or losing it.

At any pathway we choose to follow, in order for the climate to stabilise at a higher level of change, emissions need to be zero. If new carbon pollution enters the climate system, temperatures will go up. This also applies to 2.5°C emissions budgets as well as 3°C budgets.

3. Stabilisation

What is to be done? Multiple actions are under way. Our energy system is changing with global energy demand growth continuing to rise due to industrialisation of developing nations, but new added electricity capacity in the form of solar and wind power only appear to offset some of the added growth. Electricity is only a portion of our energy use profile.

The massive use of fossil fuels is the prime driver of human-caused climate change. The fraction of low-carbon energy is the same now that it was a few decades ago. Fossil fuels absolutely dominate our energy system at >80% share in total final energy consumption. Deforestation and other land-use change also contribute significantly, but our profligate use of fossil energy commits us to possibly catastrophic breakdowns of the climate system.

For a reasonable chance of keeping warming under 2℃ we can emit a further 865 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2). The climate commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 2030 are a first step, but recent analyses show they are not enough (Canadell and Smith, 2017

The trouble with negative emissions (Peters and Anderson, 2016

The carbon budget framing might seem like a radical socio-political construct but it is in fact the best depiction of the physical reality of climate change. Cumulative emissions dictate the mitigation outcome — there is absolutely no doubt about this as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has shown.

The relationship between temperature change and cumulative CO2 emissions (in GtCO2) from 1870 to the year 2100. (IPCC 2014 Synthesis Report).

It is indeed the fact that many applications of fossil energy are growing exponentially that is the problem for climate stabilisationAir travel, road freight, shipping. Exponential global growth. Based on sound understanding of the physical reality, their fossil carbon use should be declining exponentially.

Three years to safeguard our climate (Figueres at al, 2017

All of this is sadly true and supremely distressing. Emissions from fossil fuels and land use change are 60% higher than they were in 1990 when scientists established most of what has been shown above with high certainty. Only the resolution of understanding has increased along with worsening climate impacts.

F/ Honesty

Finding out the reality of this situation is a profound experience. It is a state shift in human cognition, comparable to expansion of internet and global connectivity.

What I argue as citizen is to stop lying to ourselves. We have to obey the ancient laws of nature. No amount of economic growth, green shift, denial or activism can negotiate with physical constraints of the Earth System.

Our energy system will never be able to transform fast enough to meet the Paris Agreement stabilisation target without mad assumptions of building a carbon draw down device on this planet three times the size of the current oil industry, capable of sequestering greenhouse gases from ambient air on the order of what the natural sinks like the world ocean and the land biosphere are currently doing.

Roughly 10% of us generate almost as much greenhouse gas emissions from our lifestyle as the rest of the people on this planet. Finnish household consumption added to territorial emissions at >15 tons CO2 equivalent per capita will breach the global carbon budget for lower stabilisation targets within a decade. This is a pragmatic, but also a moral issue. Nobody can escape it, no matter how much one tries.

Finnish emissions reductions and negative emissions to meet Paris Agreement framing (Climate Analytics, 2016.)

We have to transform our diets, mobility systems, energy production and conspicuous consumption within a decade to limit risks of profound magnitude. The first decade should cut all of our carbon pollution in half. The next one should halve the portion left and so on. We have to put in policies which enchance natural sinks and research artificial new sinks.

This is not an obligation just to protect future generations, poor people or animals anymore. It is a threat to huge amounts of people living in the present moment on this finite planet in our vast universe.

We have to push through this mentally, keeping focus on what there is to be done with resolute purpose against nearly impossible odds. We have to be honest to ourselves, respectful of others and lead by example in everything we do.

Everybody can enter this space with relatively little sacrifice. It might be very painful in the beginning but truth is, after all, one of the most precious things this world has to offer.

Do what comes naturally, but always remember three things: how immediate this is, what kind of rates it is progressing at and what the scale of change needed must be in order to limit risk.

And the oil rout continues unabated..

26 02 2017

Paul Gilding, whose work I generally admire, has published a new item on his blog after quite some time off. “It’s time to make the call – fossil fuels are finished. The rest is detail.” Sounds good, until you read the ‘detail’. Paul is still convinced that it’s renewable energy that will sink the fossil fuel industry. He writes…..:

The detail is interesting and important, as I expand on below. But unless we recognise the central proposition: that the fossil fuel age is coming to an end, and within 15 to 30 years – not 50 to 100 – we risk making serious and damaging mistakes in climate and economic policy, in investment strategy and in geopolitics and defence.

Except the fossil fuel age may be coming to an end within five years.. not 15 to 30.

The new emerging energy system of renewables and storage is a “technology” business, more akin to information and communications technology, where prices keep falling, quality keeps rising, change is rapid and market disruption is normal and constant. There is a familiar process that unfolds in markets with technology driven disruptions. I expand on that here in a 2012 piece I wrote in a contribution to Jorgen Randers book “2052 – A Global Forecast” (arguing the inevitability of the point we have now arrived at).

This shift to a “technology” has many implications for energy but the most profound one is very simple. As a technology, more demand for renewables means lower prices and higher quality constantly evolving for a long time to come. The resources they compete with – coal, oil and gas – follow a different pattern. If demand kept increasing, prices would go up because the newer reserves cost more to develop, such as deep sea oil. They may get cheaper through market shifts, as they have recently, but they can’t keep getting cheaper and they can never get any better.

In that context, consider this. Renewables are today on the verge of being price competitive with fossil fuels – and already are in many situations. So in 10 years, maybe just 5, it is a no-brainer that renewables will be significantly cheaper than fossil fuels in most places and will then just keep getting cheaper. And better.

With which economy Paul….? Come the next oil crisis, the economy will simply grind to a halt. Paul is also keen on electric cars….

Within a decade, electric cars will be more reliable, cheaper to own and more fun to drive than oil driven cars. Then it will just be a matter of turning over the fleet. Oil companies will then have their Kodak moment. Coal will already be largely gone, replaced by renewables.

When the economy crashes, no one will have any money to buy electric cars. It’s that simple….. Peak Debt is only just starting to make its presence felt…:

The carnage continues in the U.S. major oil industry as they sink further and further in the RED.  The top three U.S. oil companies, whose profits were once the envy of the energy sector, are now forced to borrow money to pay dividends or capital expenditures.  The financial situation at ExxonMobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips has become so dreadful, their total long-term debt surged 25% in just the past year.

Unfortunately, the majority of financial analysts at CNBC, Bloomberg or Fox Business have no clue just how bad the situation will become for the United States as its energy sector continues to disintegrate.  While the Federal Government could step in and bail out BIG OIL with printed money, they cannot print barrels of oil.

Watch closely as the Thermodynamic Oil Collapse will start to pick up speed over the next five years.

According to the most recently released financial reports, the top three U.S. oil companies combined net income was the worst ever.  The results can be seen in the chart below:

Can the news on the collapse of the oil industry worsen…..? You bet……

According to James Burgess,

A total of 351,410 jobs have been slashed by oil and gas production companies worldwide, with the oilfield services sector bearing much of this burden, according to a new report released this week.

The report, based on statistical analysis by Houston-based Graves & Co., puts the number of jobs lost in the oilfield services sector at 152,015 now—or 43.2 percent of the global total since oil prices began to slump in mid-2014.

And then there are the bankruptcies……

A report published earlier this month by Haynes and Boone found that ninety gas and oil producers in the United States (US) and Canada have filed for bankruptcy from 3 January, 2015 to 1 August, 2016.

Approximately US$66.5 billion in aggregate debt has been declared in dozens of bankruptcy cases including Chapter 7, Chapter 11 and Chapter 15, based on the analysis from the international corporate law firm.

Texas leads the number of bankruptcy filings with 44 during the time period measured by Haynes and Boone, and also has the largest number of debt declared in courts with around US$29.5 billion.

Forty-two energy companies filed bankruptcy in 2015 and declared approximately US$17.85 billion in defaulted debt. The costliest bankruptcy filing last year occurred in September when Samson Resources filed for Chapter 11 protection with an accumulated debt of roughly US$4.2 billion.

Then we have Saudi Arabia’s decision to cut production to manipulate the price of oil upwards. So far, it appears to have reached a ceiling of $58 a barrel, a 16 to 36 percent increase over the plateau it had been on for months last year. But this has also come at a cost.

The world hasn’t really caught on yet, but OPEC is in serious trouble.  Last year, OPEC’s net oil export revenues collapsed.  How bad?  Well, how about 65% since the oil price peaked in 2012.  To offset falling oil prices and revenues, OPEC nations have resorted to liquidating some of their foreign exchange reserves.

The largest OPEC oil producer and exporter, Saudi Arabia, has seen its Foreign Currency reserves plummet over the past two years… and the liquidation continues.  For example, Saudi Arabia’s foreign exchange reserves declined another $2 billion in December 2016 (source: Trading Economics).

Now, why would Saudi Arabia need to liquidate another $2 billion of its foreign exchange reserves after the price of a barrel of Brent crude jumped to $53.3 in December, up from $44.7 in November??  That was a 13% surge in the price of Brent crude in one month.  Which means, even at $53 a barrel, Saudi Arabia is still hemorrhaging.

Before I get into how bad things are becoming in Saudi Arabia, let’s take a look at the collapse of OPEC net oil export revenues:

The mighty OPEC oil producers enjoyed a healthy $951 billion in net oil export revenues in 2012.  However, this continued to decline along with the rapidly falling oil price and reached a low of $334 billion in 2016.  As I mentioned before, this was a 65% collapse in OPEC oil revenues in just four years.

Last time OPEC’s net oil export revenues were this low was in 2004.  Then, OPEC oil revenues were $370 billion at an average Brent crude price of $38.3.  Compare that to $334 billion in oil revenues in 2016 at an average Brent crude price of $43.5 a barrel…….

This huge decline in OPEC oil revenues gutted these countries foreign exchange reserves.  Which means, the falling EROI- Energy Returned On Investment is taking a toll on the OPEC oil exporting countries bottom line.  A perfect example of this is taking place in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia was building its foreign exchange reserves for years until the price of oil collapsed, starting in 2014.  At its peak, Saudi Arabia held $797 billion in foreign currency reserves:

(note: figures shown in SAR- Saudi Arabia Riyal currency)

In just two and a half years, Saudi Arabia’s currency reserves have declined a staggering 27%, or roughly $258 billion (U.S. Dollars) to $538 billion currently.  Even more surprising, Saudi Arabia’s foreign currency reserves continue to collapse as the oil price rose towards the end of 2016:

The BLUE BARS represent Saudi Arabia’s foreign exchange reserves and the prices on the top show the average monthly Brent crude price.  In January 2016, Brent crude oil was $30.7 a barrel.  However, as the oil price continued to increase (yes, some months it declined a bit), Saudi’s currency reserves continued to fall.

This problem is getting bad enough that for the first time ever, the Saudi government has, shock horror,  started taxing its people….

Tax-free living will soon be a thing of the past for Saudis after its cabinet on Monday approved an IMF-backed value-added tax to be imposed across the Gulf following an oil slump.

A 5% levy will apply to certain goods following an agreement with the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council in June last year.

Residents of the energy-rich region had long enjoyed a tax-free and heavily subsidised existence but the collapse in crude prices since 2014 sparked cutbacks and a search for new revenue.

How long before Saudi Arabia becomes the next Syria is anyone’s guess, but I do not see any economic scenario conducive to Paul Gilding’s “Great Disruption”. The great disruption will not be the energy take over by renewables, it will be the end of freely available energy slaves supplied by fossil fuels. I believe Paul has moved to Tasmania, in fact not very far from here….. I hope he’s started digging his garden.


6 07 2016

15 Realities of our Global Environmental Crisis

By Deep Green Resistance

  1. Industrial civilization is not, and can never be, sustainable.

Any social system based on the use of non-renewable resources is by definition unsustainable. Non-renewable means it will eventually run out. If you hyper-exploit your non-renewable surroundings, you will deplete them and die. Even for your renewable surroundings like trees, if you exploit them faster than they can regenerate, you will deplete them and die. This is precisely what civilization has been doing for its 10,000-year campaign – running through soil, rivers, and forests as well as metal, coal, and oil.

  1. Industrial civilization is causing a global collapse of life.

Due to industrial civilization’s insatiable appetite for growth, we have exceeded the planet’s carrying capacity. Once the carrying capacity of an area is surpassed, the ecological community is severely damages, and the longer the overshoot lasts, the worse the damage, until the population eventually collapses. This collapse is happening now. Every 24 hours up to 200 species become extinct. 90% of the large fish in the oceans are gone. 98% of native forests, 99% of wetlands, and 99% of native grasslands have been wiped out.


  1. Industrial civilization is based on and requires ongoing systematic violence to operate.

This way of life is based on the perceived right of the powerful to take whatever resources they want. All land on which industrial civilization is now based on land that was taken by force from its original inhabitants, and shaped using processes – industrial forestry, mining, smelting – that violently shape the world to industrial ends. Traditional communities do not often voluntarily give up or sell resources on which their communities and homes are based and do not willingly allow their landbases to be damaged so that other resources – gold, oil, and so on – can be extracted. It follows that those who want the resources will do what they can to acquire these resources by any means necessary. Resource extraction cannot be accomplished without force and exploitation.

  1. In order for the world as we know it to exist on a day-to-day basis, a vast and growing degree of destruction and death must occur.

Industrialization is a process of taking entire communities of living beings and turning them into commodities and dead zones. Trace every industrial artifact back to its source­ and you find the same devastation: mining, clear-cuts, dams, agriculture, and now tar sands, mountaintop removal, and wind farms. These atrocities, and others like them, happen all around us, every day, just to keep things running normally. There is no kinder, greener version of industrial civilization that will do the trick of leaving us a living planet.

  1. This way of being is not natural.

Humans and their immediate evolutionary predecessors lived sustainably for at least a million years. It is not “human nature” to destroy one’s habitat. The “centralization of political power, the separation of classes, the lifetime division of labor, the mechanization of production, the magnification of military power, the economic exploitation of the weak, and the universal introduction of slavery and forced labor for both industrial and military purposes”[1] are only chief features of civilization, and are constant throughout its history.

  1. Industrial civilization is only possible with cheap energy.

The only reason industrial processes such as large-scale agriculture and mining even function is because of cheap oil; without that, industrial processes go back to depending on slavery and serfdom, as in most of the history of civilization.

  1. Peak oil, and hence the era of cheap oil, has passed.

Peak oil is the point at which oil production hits its maximum rate. Peak oil has passed and extraction will decline from this point onwards. This rapid decline in the availability of global energy will result in increasing economic disruption and upset. The increasing cost and decreasing supply of energy will undermine manufacturing and transportation and cause global economic turmoil. Individuals, companies, and even states will go bankrupt. International trade will nosedive because of a global depression. The poor will be unable to cope with the increasing cost of basic goods, and eventually the financial limits will result in large-scale energy-intensive manufacturing becoming impossible – resulting in, among other things – the collapse of agricultural infrastructure, and the associated transportation and distribution network.

At this point in time, there are no good short-term outcomes for global human society. The collapse of industrial civilization is inevitable, with or without our input, it’s just a matter of time. The problem is that every day the gears of this destructive system continue grinding is another day it wages war on the natural world. With up to 200 species and more than 80,000 acres of rainforest being wiped out daily as just some of the atrocities occurring systematically to keep our lifestyles afloat, the sooner this collapse is induced the better.

  1. “Green technologies” and “renewable energy” are not sustainable and will not save the planet.

Solar panels and wind turbines aren’t made out of nothing.  These “green” technologies are made out of metals, plastics, and chemicals. These products have been mined out of the ground, transported vast distances, processed and manufactured in big factories, and require regular maintenance. Each of these stages causes widespread environmental destruction, and each of these stages is only possible with the mass use of cheap energy from fossil fuels. Neither fossil fuels nor mined minerals will ever be sustainable; by definition, they will run out. Even recycled materials must undergo extremely energy-intensive production processes before they can be reused.[2]


  1. Personal consumption habits will not save the planet.

Consumer culture and the capitalist mindset have taught us to substitute acts of personal consumption for organized political resistance. Personal consumption habits — changing light bulbs, going vegan, shorter showers, recycling, taking public transport — have nothing to do with shifting power away from corporations, or stopping the growth economy that is destroying the planet. Besides, 90% of the water used by humans is used by agriculture and industry. Three quarters of energy is consumed and 95% of waste is produced by commercial, industrial, corporate, agricultural and military industries. By blaming the individual, we are accepting capitalism’s redefinition of us from citizens to consumers, reducing our potential forms of resistance to consuming and not consuming.

  1. There will not be a mass voluntary transformation to a sane and sustainable way of living.

The current material systems of power make any chance of significant social or political reform impossible. Those in power get too many benefits from destroying the planet to allow systematic changes which would reduce their privilege. Keeping this system running is worth more to them than the human and non-human lives destroyed by the extraction, processing, and utilization of natural resources.

  1. We are afraid.

The primary reason we don’t resist is because we are afraid. We know if we act decisively to protect the places and creatures we love or if we act decisively to stop corporate exploitation of the poor, that those in power will come down on us with the full power of the state. We can talk all we want about how we live in a democracy, and we can talk all we want about the consent of the governed. But what it really comes down to is that if you effectively oppose the will of those in power, they will try to kill you. We need to make that explicit so we can face the situation we’re in: those in power are killing the planet and they are exploiting the poor, and we are not stopping them because we are afraid. This is how authoritarian regimes and abusers work: they make their victims and bystanders afraid to act.

  1. If we only fight within the system, we lose.

Things will not suddenly change by using the same approaches we’ve been using for the past 30 years. When nothing is working to stop or even slow the destruction’s acceleration, then it is time to change your strategy. Until now, most of our tactics and discourse (whether civil disobedience, writing letters and books, carrying signs, protecting small patches of forest, filing lawsuits, or conducting scientific research) remain firmly embedded in whatever actions are authorized by the overarching structures that permit the destruction in the first place.


  1. Dismantling industrial civilization is the only rational, permanent solution.

Our strategies until now have failed because neither our violent nor nonviolent responses are attempts to rid us of industrial civilization itself. By allowing the framing conditions to remain, we guarantee a continuation of the behaviors these framing conditions necessitate. If we do not put a halt to it, civilization will continue to immiserate the vast majority of humans and to degrade the planet until it (civilization, and probably the planet) collapses. The longer we wait for civilization to crash – or we ourselves bring it down – the messier will be the crash, and the worse things will be for those humans and nonhumans who live during it, and for those who come after.

  1. Militant resistance works.

Study of past social insurgencies and resistance movements shows that specific types of asymmetric warfare strategies are extremely effective.

  1. We must build a culture of resistance.

Some things, including a living planet, that are worth fighting for at any cost, when other means of stopping the abuses have been exhausted. One of the good things about industrial civilization being so ubiquitously destructive, is that no matter where you look – no matter what your gifts, no matter where your heart lies – there’s desperately important work to be done. Some of us need to file timber sales appeals and lawsuits. Some need to help family farmers or work on other sustainable agriculture issues. Some need to work on rape crisis hot lines, or at battered women’s shelters. Some need to work on fair trade, or on stopping international trade altogether. Some of us need to take down dams, oil pipelines, mining equipment, and electrical infrastructure. [NOTE: I am NOT in favor of taking down dams…]

We need to fight for what we love, fight harder than we have ever thought we could fight, because the bottom line is that any option in which industrial civilization remains, results in a dead planet.


Parts of this article were drawn from Deep Green Resistance: A Strategy to Save the Planet, by Aric McBay, Lierre Keith, and Derrick Jensen.

[1] Lewis Mumford, Myth of the Machine, Volume 2,  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970, page 186.

[2] Recycled materials also usually degrade over time, limiting their recycling potential.

We Could Be Witnessing the Death of the Fossil Fuel Industry—Will It Take the Rest of the Economy Down With It?

24 04 2016


Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed

Originally published on Alternet’s website, this compelling article by Nafeez Ahmed supports much of what has been published on Damnthematrix…..

It’s not looking good for the global fossil fuel industry. Although the world remains heavily dependent on oil, coal and natural gas—which today supply around 80 percent of our primary energy needs—the industry is rapidly crumbling.

This is not merely a temporary blip, but a symptom of a deeper, long-term process related to global capitalism’s escalating overconsumption of planetary resources and raw materials.

New scientific research shows that the growing crisis of profitability facing fossil fuel industries is part of an inevitable period of transition to a post-carbon era.

But ongoing denialism has led powerful vested interests to continue clinging blindly to their faith in fossil fuels, with increasingly devastating and unpredictable consequences for the environment.

Bankruptcy epidemic

In February, the financial services firm Deloitte predicted that over 35 percent of independent oil companies worldwide are likely to declare bankruptcy, potentially followed by a further 30 percent next year—a total of 65 percent of oil firms around the world. Since early last year, already 50 North American oil and gas producers have filed bankruptcy.

The cause of the crisis is the dramatic drop in oil prices—down by two-thirds since 2014—which are so low that oil companies are finding it difficult to generate enough revenue to cover the high costs of production, while also repaying their loans.

Oil and gas companies most at risk are those with the largest debt burden. And that burden is huge—as much as $2.5 trillion, according to The Economist. The real figure is probably higher.

At a speech at the London School of Economics in February, Jaime Caruana of the Bank for International Settlements said that outstanding loans and bonds for the oil and gas industry had almost tripled between 2006 and 2014 to a total of $3 trillion.

This massive debt burden, he explained, has put the industry in a double-bind: In order to service the debt, they are continuing to produce more oil for sale, but that only contributes to lower market prices. Decreased oil revenues means less capacity to repay the debt, thus increasing the likelihood of default.

Stranded assets

This $3 trillion of debt is at risk because it was supposed to generate a 3-to-1 increase in value, but instead—thanks to the oil price decline—represents a value of less than half of this.

Worse, according to a Goldman Sachs study quietly published in December last year, as much as $1 trillion of investments in future oil projects around the world are unprofitable; i.e., effectively stranded.

Examining 400 of the world’s largest new oil and gas fields (except U.S. shale), the Goldman study found that $930 billion worth of projects (more than two-thirds) are unprofitable at Brent crude prices below $70. (Prices are now well below that.)

The collapse of these projects due to unprofitability would result in the loss of oil and gas production equivalent to a colossal 8 percent of current global demand. If that happens, suddenly or otherwise, it would wreck the global economy.

The Goldman analysis was based purely on the internal dynamics of the industry. A further issue is that internationally-recognized climate change risks mean that to avert dangerous global warming, much of the world’s remaining fossil fuel resources cannot be burned.

All of this is leading investors to question the wisdom of their investments, given fears that much of the assets that the oil, gas and coal industries use to estimate their own worth could consist of resources that will never ultimately be used.

The Carbon Tracker Initiative, which analyzes carbon investment risks, points out that over the next decade, fossil fuel companies risk wasting up to $2.2 trillion of investments in new projects that could turn out to be “uneconomic” in the face of international climate mitigation policies.

More and more fossil fuel industry shareholders are pressuring energy companies to stop investing in exploration for fear that new projects could become worthless due to climate risks.

“Clean technology and climate policy are already reducing fossil fuel demand,” said James Leaton, head of research at Carbon Tracker. “Misreading these trends will destroy shareholder value. Companies need to apply 2C stress tests to their business models now.”

In a prescient report published last November, Carbon Tracker identified the energy majors with the greatest exposures—and thus facing the greatest risks—from stranded assets: Royal Dutch Shell, Pemex, Exxon Mobil, Peabody Energy, Coal India and Glencore.

At the time, the industry scoffed at such a bold pronouncement. Six months after this report was released—a week ago—Peabody went bankrupt. Who’s next?

The Carbon Tracker analysis may underestimate the extent of potential losses. A new paper just out in the journal Applied Energy, from a team at Oxford University’s Institute for New Economic Thinking, shows that the “stranded assets” concept applies not just to unburnable fossil fuel reserves, but also to a vast global carbon-intensive electricity infrastructure, which could be rendered as defunct as the fossil fuels it burns and supplies to market.

The coming debt spiral

Some analysts believe the hidden trillion-dollar black hole at the heart of the oil industry is set to trigger another global financial crisis, similar in scale to the Dot-Com crash.

Jason Schenker, president and chief economist at Prestige Economics, says: “Oil prices simply aren’t going to rise fast enough to keep oil and energy companies from defaulting. Then there is a real contagion risk to financial companies and from there to the rest of the economy.”

Schenker has been ranked by Bloomberg News as one of the most accurate financial forecasters in the world since 2010. The US economy, he forecasts, will dip into recession at the end of 2016 or early 2017.

Mark Harrington, an oil industry consultant, goes further. He believes the resulting economic crisis from cascading debt defaults in the industry could make the 2007-8 financial crash look like a cakewalk. “Oil and gas companies borrowed heavily when oil prices were soaring above $70 a barrel,” he wrote on CNBC in January.

“But in the past 24 months, they’ve seen their values and cash flows erode ferociously as oil prices plunge—and that’s made it hard for some to pay back that debt. This could lead to a massive credit crunch like the one we saw in 2008. With our economy just getting back on its feet from the global 2008 financial crisis, timing could not be worse.”

Ratings agency Standard & Poor (S&P) reported this week that 46 companies have defaulted on their debt this year—the highest levels since the depths of the financial crisis in 2009. The total quantity in defaults so far is $50 billion.

Half this year’s defaults are from the oil and gas industry, according to S&P, followed by the metals, mining and the steel sector. Among them was coal giant Peabody Energy.

Despite public reassurances, bank exposure to these energy risks from unfunded loan facilities remains high. Officially, only 2.5 percent of bank assets are exposed to energy risks.

But it’s probably worse. Confidential Wall Street sources claim that the Federal Reserve in Dallas has secretly advised major U.S. banks in closed-door meetings to cover-up potential energy-related losses. The Federal Reserve denies the allegations, but refuses to respond to Freedom of Information requests on internal meetings, on the obviously false pretext that it keeps no records of any of its meetings.

According to Bronka Rzepkoswki of the financial advisory firm Oxford Economics, over a third of the entire U.S. high yield bond index is vulnerable to low oil prices, increasing the risk of a tidal wave of corporate bankruptcies: “Conditions that usually pave the way for mounting defaults—such as growing bad debt, tightening monetary conditions, tightening of corporate credit standards and volatility spikes – are currently met in the U.S.”

The end of cheap oil

Behind the crisis of oil’s profitability that threatens the entire global economy is a geophysical crisis in the availability of cheap oil. Cheap here does not refer simply to the market price of oil, but the total cost of production. More specifically, it refers to the value of energy.

There is a precise scientific measure for this, virtually unknown in conventional economic and financial circles, known as Energy Return on Investment—which essentially quantifies the amount of energy extracted, compared to the inputs of energy needed to conduct the extraction. The concept of EROI was first proposed and developed by Professor Charles A. Hall of the Department of Environmental and Forest Biology at the State University of New York. He found that an approximate EROI value for any energy source could be calculated by dividing the quantity of energy produced by the amount of energy inputted into the production process.

Therefore, the higher the EROI, the more energy that a particular source and technology is capable of producing. The lower the EROI, the less energy this source and technology is actually producing.

A new peer-reviewed study led by the Institute of Physics at the National Autonomous University of Mexico has undertaken a comparative review of the EROI of all the major sources of energy that currently underpin industrial civilization—namely oil, gas, coal, and uranium.

Published in the journal Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, the scientists note that the EROI for fossil fuels has inexorably declined over a relatively short period of time: “Nowadays, the world average value EROI for hydrocarbons in the world has gone from a value of 35 to a value of 15 between 1960 and 1980.”

In other words, in just two decades, the total value of the energy being produced via fossil fuel extraction has plummeted by more than half. And it continues to decline.

This is because the more fossil fuel resources that we exploit, the more we have used up those resources that are easiest and cheapest to extract. This compels the industry to rely increasingly on resources that are more difficult and expensive to get out of the ground, and bring to market.

The EROI for conventional oil, according to the Mexican scientists, is 18. They estimate, optimistically, that: “World reserves could last for 35 or 45 years at current consumption rates.” For gas, the EROI is 10, and world reserves will last around “45 or 55 years.” Nuclear’s EROI is 6.5, and according to the study authors, “The peak in world production of uranium will be reached by 2045.”

The problem is that although we are not running out of oil, we are running out of the cheapest, easiest to extract form of oil and gas. Increasingly, the industry is making up for the shortfall by turning to unconventional forms of oil and gas—but these have very little energy value from an EROI perspective.

The Mexico team examine the EROI values of these unconventional sources, tar sands, shale oil, and shale gas: “The average value for EROI of tar sands is four. Only ten percent of that amount is economically profitable with current technology.”

For shale oil and gas, the situation is even more dire: “The EROI varies between 1.5 and 4, with an average value of 2.8. Shale oil is very similar to the tar sands; being both oil sources of very low quality. The shale gas revolution did not start because its exploitation was a very good idea; but because the most attractive economic opportunities were previously exploited and exhausted.”

In effect, the growing reliance on unconventional oil and gas has meant that, overall, the costs and inputs into energy production to keep industrial civilization moving are rising inexorably.

It’s not that governments don’t know. It’s that decisions have already been made to protect the vested interests that have effectively captured government policymaking through lobbying, networking and donations.

Three years ago, the British government’s Department for International Development (DFID) commissioned and published an in-depth report, “EROI of Global Energy Resources: Status, Trends and Social Implications.” The report went completely unnoticed by the media.

Its findings are instructive: “We find the EROI for each major fossil fuel resource (except coal) has declined substantially over the last century. Most renewable and non-conventional energy alternatives have substantially lower EROI values than conventional fossil fuels.”

The decline in EROI has meant that an increasing amount of the energy we extract is having to be diverted back into getting new energy out, leaving less for other social investments.

This means that the global economic slowdown is directly related to the declining resource quality of fossil fuels. The DFID report warns: “The declining EROI of traditional fossil fuel energy sources and its eventual effect on the world economy are likely to result in a myriad of unforeseen consequences.”

Shortly after this report was released, I met with a senior civil servant at DFID familiar with its findings, who spoke to me on condition of anonymity. I asked him whether this important research had actually impacted policymaking in the department.

“Unfortunately, no,” he told me, shrugging. “Most of my colleagues, except perhaps a handful, simply don’t have a clue about these issues. And of course, despite the report being circulated widely within the department, and shared with other relevant government departments, there is little interest from ministers who appear to be ideologically pre-committed to fracking.”

Peak oil

The driving force behind the accelerating decline in resource quality, hotly denied in the industry, is ‘peak oil.’

An extensive scientific analysis published in February in Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy & Environment lays bare the extent of industry denialism. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews (WIRES) is a series of high-quality peer-reviewed publications which runs authoritative reviews of the literature across relevant academic disciplines.

The new WIRES paper is authored by Professor Michael Jefferson of the ESCP Europe Business School, a former chief economist at oil major Royal Dutch/Shell Group, where he spent nearly 20 years in various senior roles from Head of Planning in Europe to Director of Oil Supply and Trading. He later became Deputy Secretary-General of the World Energy Council, and is editor of the leading Elsevier science journal Energy Policy.

In his new study, Jefferson examines a recent 1865-page “global energy assessment” (GES) published by the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis. But he criticized the GES for essentially ducking the issue of ‘peak oil.”

“This was rather odd,” he wrote. “First, because the evidence suggests that the global production of conventional oil plateaued and may have begun to decline from 2005.”

He went on to explain that standard industry assessments of the size of global conventional oil reserves have been dramatically inflated, noting how “the five major Middle East oil exporters altered the basis of their definition of ‘proved’ conventional oil reserves from a 90 percent probability down to a 50 percent probability from 1984. The result has been an apparent (but not real) increase in their ‘proved’ conventional oil reserves of some 435 billion barrels.”

Added to those estimates are reserve figures from Venezuelan heavy oil and Canadian tar sands, bringing up global reserve estimates by a further 440 billion barrels, despite the fact that they are “more difficult and costly to extract” and generally of “poorer quality” than conventional oil.

“Put bluntly, the standard claim that the world has proved conventional oil reserves of nearly 1.7 trillion barrels is overstated by about 875 billion barrels. Thus, despite the fall in crude oil prices from a new peak in June, 2014, after that of July, 2008, the ‘peak oil’ issue remains with us.”

Jefferson believes that a nominal economic recovery, combined with cutbacks in production as the industry reacts to its internal crises, will eventually put the current oil supply glut in reverse. This will pave the way for “further major oil price rises” in years to come.

It’s not entirely clear if this will happen. If the oil crisis hits the economy hard, then the prolonged recession that results could dampen the rising demand that everyone projects. If oil prices thus remain relatively depressed for longer than expected, this could hemorrhage the industry beyond repair.

Eventually, the loss of production may allow prices to rise again. OPEC estimates that investments in oil exploration and development are at their lowest level in six years. As bankruptcies escalate, the accompanying drop in investments will eventually lead world oil production to fall, even as global demand begins to rise.

This could lead oil prices to climb much higher, as rocketing demand—projected to grow 50 percent by 2035—hits the scarcity of production. Such a price spike, ironically, would also be incredibly bad for the global economy, and as happened with the 2007-8 financial crash, could feed into inflation and trigger another spate of consumer debt-defaults in the housing markets.

Even if that happens, the assumption—the hope—is that oil industry majors will somehow survive the preceding cascade of debt-defaults. The other assumption, is that demand for oil will rise.

But as new sources of renewable energy come online at a faster and faster pace, as innovation in clean technologies accelerates, old fossil fuel-centric projections of future rising demand for oil may need to be jettisoned.

Clean energy

According to another new study released in March in Energy Policy by two scientists at Texas A&M University, “Non-renewable energy”—that is “fossil fuels and nuclear power”—“are projected to peak around mid-century … Subsequent declining non-renewable production will require a rapid expansion in the renewable energy sources (RES) if either population and/or economic growth is to continue.”

The demise of the fossil fuel empire, the study forecasts, is inevitable. Whichever model run the scientists used, the end output was the same: the almost total displacement of fossil fuels by renewable energy sources by the end of the century; and, as a result, the transformation and localisation of economic activity.

But the paper adds that to avoid a rise in global average temperatures of 2C, which would tip climate change into the danger zone, 50 percent or more of existing fossil fuel reserves must remain unused.

The imperative to transition away from fossil fuels is, therefore, both geophysical and environmental. On the one hand, by mid-century, fossil fuels and nuclear power will become obsolete as a viable source of energy due to their increasingly high costs and low quality. On the other, even before then, to maintain what scientists describe as a ‘safe operating space’ for human survival, we cannot permit the planet to warm a further 2C without risking disastrous climate impacts.

Staying below 2C, the study finds, will require renewable energy to supply more than 50 percent of total global energy by 2028, “a 37-fold increase in the annual rate of supplying renewable energy in only 13 years.”

While this appears to be a herculean task by any standard, the Texas A&M scientists conclude that by century’s end, the demise of fossil fuels is going to happen anyway, with or without considerations over climate risks:

… the ‘ambitious’ end-of-century decarbonisation goals set by the G7 leaders will be achieved due to economic and geologic fossil fuel limitations within even the unconstrained scenario in which little-to-no pro-active commitment to decarbonise is required… Our model results indicate that, with or without climate considerations, RES [renewable energy sources] will comprise 87–94 percent of total energy demand by the end of the century.

But as renewables have a much lower EROI than fossil fuels, this will “quickly reduce the share of net energy available for societal use.” With less energy available to societies, “it is speculated that there will have to be a reprioritization of societal energetic needs”—in other words, a very different kind of economy in which unlimited material growth underpinned by endless inputs of cheap fossil fuel energy are a relic of the early 21st century.

The 37-fold annual rate of increase in the renewable energy supply seems unachievable at first glance, but new data just released from the Abu Dhabi-based International Renewable Energy Agency shows that clean power is well on its way, despite lacking the massive subsidies behind fossil fuels.

The data reveals that last year, solar power capacity rose by 37 percent. Wind power grew by 17 percent, geothermal by 5 percent and hydropower by 3 percent.

So far, the growth rate for solar power has been exponential. A Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions report from September 2015 noted that the speed and spread of solar energy had consistently outpaced conventional linear projections, and continues to do so.

While the costs of solar power is consistently declining, solar power generation has doubled every year for the last 20 years. With every doubling of solar infrastructure, the production costs of solar photovoltaic (PV) has dropped by 22 percent.

At this rate, according to analysts like Tony Seba—a lecturer in business entrepreneurship, disruption and clean energy at Stanford University—the growth of solar is already on track to go global. With eight more doublings, that’s by 2030, solar power would be capable of supplying 100 percent of the world’s energy needs. And that’s even without the right mix of government policies in place to support renewables.

According to Deloitte, while Seba’s forecast is endorsed by a minority of experts, it remains a real possibility that should be taken seriously. But the firm points out that obstacles remain:

“It would not make economic sense for utility planners to shutter thousands of megawatts of existing generating capacity before the end of its economic life and replace it with new solar generation.”

Yet Deloitte’s study did not account for the escalating crisis in profitability already engulfing the fossil fuel industries, and the looming pressure of stranded assets due to climate risks. As the uneconomic nature of fossil fuels becomes evermore obvious, so too will the economic appeal of clean energy.

Race against time

The question is whether the transition to a post-carbon energy system—the acceptance of the inevitable death of the oil economy—will occur fast enough to avoid climate catastrophe.

Given that the 2C target for a safe climate is widely recognized to be inadequate—scientists increasingly argue that even a 1C rise in global average temperatures would be sufficient to trigger dangerous, irreversible changes to the earth’s climate.

According to a 2011 report by the National Academy of Sciences, the scientific consensus shows conservatively that for every degree of warming, we will see the following impacts: 5-15 percent reductions in crop yields; 3-10 percent increases in rainfall in some regions contributing to flooding; 5-10 percent decreases in stream-flow in some river basins, including the Arkansas and the Rio Grande, contributing to scarcity of potable water; 200-400 percent increases in the area burned by wildfire in the US; 15 percent decreases in annual average Arctic sea ice, with 25 percent decreases in the yearly minimum extent in September.

Even if all CO2 emissions stopped, the climate would continue to warm for several more centuries. Over thousands of years, the National Academy warns, this could unleash amplifying feedbacks leading to the disappearance of the polar ice sheets and other dramatic changes. In the meantime, the risk of catastrophic wild cards “such as the potential large-scale release of methane from deep-sea sediments” or permafrost, is impossible to quantify.

In this context, even if the solar-driven clean energy revolution had every success, we still need to remove carbon that has already accumulated in the atmosphere, to return the climate to safety.

The idea of removing carbon from the atmosphere sounds technologically difficult and insanely expensive. It’s not. In reality, it is relatively simple and cheap.

A new book by Eric Toensmeier, a lecturer at Yale University’s School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, The Carbon Farming Solution, sets out in stunningly accessible fashion how ‘regenerative farming’ provides the ultimate carbon-sequestration solution.

Regenerative farming is a form of small-scale, localised, community-centred organic agriculture which uses techniques that remove carbon from the atmosphere, and sequester it in plant material or soil.

Using an array of land management and conservation practices, many of which have been tried and tested by indigenous communities, it’s theoretically possible to scale up regenerative farming methods in a way that dramatically offsets global carbon emissions.

Toensmeier’s valuable book discusses these techniques, and unlike other science-minded tomes, offers a practical toolkit for communities to begin exploring how they can adopt regenerative farming practices for themselves.

According to the Rodale Institute, the application of regenerative farming on a global scale could have revolutionary results:

Simply put, recent data from farming systems and pasture trials around the globe show that we could sequester more than 100 percent of current annual CO2 emissions with a switch to widely available and inexpensive organic management practices, which we term ‘regenerative organic agriculture’… These practices work to maximize carbon fixation while minimizing the loss of that carbon once returned to the soil, reversing the greenhouse effect.

This has been widely corroborated. For instance, a 2015 study part-funded by the Chinese Academy of Sciences found that “replacing chemical fertilizer with organic manure significantly decreased the emission of GHGs [greenhouse gases]. Yields of wheat and corn also increased as the soil fertility was improved by the application of cattle manure. Totally replacing chemical fertilizer with organic manure decreased GHG emissions, which reversed the agriculture ecosystem from a carbon source… to a carbon sink.”

Governments are catching on, if slowly. At the Paris climate talks, 25 countries and over 50 NGOs signed up to the French government’s ‘4 per 1000’ initiative, a global agreement to promote regenerative farming as a solution for food security and climate disaster.

The birth of post-capitalism

There can be no doubt, then, that by the end of this century, life as we know it on planet earth will be very different. Fossil fueled predatory capitalism will be dead. In its place, human civilization will have little choice but to rely on a diversity of clean, renewable energy sources.

Whatever choices we make this century, the coming generations in the post-carbon future will have to deal with the realities of an overall warmer, and therefore more unpredictable, climate. Even if regenerative processes are in place to draw-down carbon from the atmosphere, this takes time—and in the process, some of the damage climate change will wreak on our oceans, our forests, our waterways, our coasts, and our soils will be irreversible.

It could take centuries, if not millennia, for the planet to reach a new, stable equilibrium.

But either way, the work of repairing and mitigating at least some of the damage done will be the task of our childrens’ children, and their children, and on.

Economic activity in this global society will of necessity be very different to the endless growth juggernaut we have experienced since the industrial revolution. In this post-carbon future, material production and consumption, and technological innovation, will only be sustainable through a participatory ‘circular economy’ in which scarce minerals and raw materials are carefully managed.

The fast-paced consumerism that we take for granted today simply won’t work in these circumstances.

Large top-down national and transnational structures will begin to become obsolete due to the large costs of maintenance, the unsustainability of the energy inputs needed for their survival, and the shift in power to new decentralized producers of energy and food.

In the place of such top-down structures, smaller-scale, networked forms of political, social and economic organization, connected through revolutionary information technologies, will be most likely to succeed. For communities to not just survive, but thrive, they will need to work together, sharing technology, expertise and knowledge on the basis of a new culture of human parity and cooperation.

Of course, before we get to this point, there will be upheaval. Today’s fossil fuel incumbency remains in denial, and is unlikely to accept the reality of its inevitable demise until it really does drop dead.

The escalation of resource wars, domestic unrest, xenophobia, state-militarism, and corporate totalitarianism is to be expected. These are the death throes of a system that has run its course.

The outcomes of the struggles which emerge in coming decades—struggles between people and power, but also futile geopolitical struggles within the old centers of power (paralleled by misguided struggles between peoples)—is yet to be written.

Eager to cling to the last vestiges of existence, the old centers of power will still try to self-maximize within the framework of the old paradigm, at the expense of competing power-centers, and even their own populations.

And they will deflect from the root causes of the problem as much as possible, by encouraging their constituents to blame other power-centers, or worse, some of their fellow citizens, along the lines of all manner of ‘Otherizing’ constructs, race, ethnicity, nationality, color, religion and even class.

Have no doubt. In coming decades, we will watch the old paradigm cannibalize itself to death on our TV screens, tablets and cell phones. Many of us will do more than watch. We will be participant observers, victims or perpetrators, or both at once.

The only question that counts, is as follows: amidst this unfolding maelstrom, are we going to join with others to plant the seeds of viable post-carbon societies for the next generations of human-beings, or are we going to stand in the way of that viable future by giving ourselves entirely to defending our ‘interests’ in the framework of the old paradigm?

Whatever happens over coming decades, it will be the choices each of us make that will ultimately determine the nature of what survives by the end of this pivotal, transitional century.

Nafeez Ahmed is an investigative journalist and international security scholar. He writes the System Shift column for VICE’s Motherboard, and is the winner of a 2015 Project Censored Award for Outstanding Investigative Journalism for his former work at the Guardian. He is the author of A User’s Guide to the Crisis of Civilization: And How to Save It (2010), and the scifi thriller novel Zero Point, among other books.

Implications of declining EROI on oil production 2013 by David J. Murphy

21 06 2015

Quite technical but a good read if you are so inclined……..

Posted on by

Murphy, David J. December 2, 2013. The implications of the declining energy return on investment of oil production. Trans. R. Soc. A 2014 372

[This is a great paper on EROI, highly recommended. Without EROI studies, we risk building energy capturing contraptions that end up being useless, consuming more oil than generated, the Easter Island Heads of our former civilization. Alice Friedemann,]

Declining production from conventional oil resources has initiated a global transition to unconventional oil, such as tar sands. Unconventional oil is generally harder to extract than conventional oil and is expected to have a (much) lower energy return on (energy) investment (EROI). Recently, there has been a surge in publications estimating the EROI of a number of different sources of oil, and others relating EROI to long-term economic growth, profitability and oil prices. The following points seem clear from a review of the literature: (i) the EROI of global oil production is roughly 17 and declining, while that for the USA is 11 and declining; (ii) the EROI of ultra-deep- water oil and oil sands is below 10; (iii) the relation between the EROI and the price of oil is inverse and exponential; (iv) as EROI declines below 10, a point is reached when the relation between EROI and price becomes highly nonlinear; and (v) the minimum oil price needed to increase the oil supply in the near term is at levels consistent with levels that have induced past economic recessions. From these points, I conclude that, as the EROI of the average barrel of oil declines, long-term economic growth will become harder to achieve and come at an increasingly higher financial, energetic and environmental cost.


Today’s oil industry is going through a fundamental change: conventional oil fields are being rapidly depleted and new production is being derived increasingly from unconventional sources, such as tar or oil sands and shale (or tight) oil. Indeed, much of the so-called ‘peak oil debate’ rests on whether or not these sources can be produced at rates comparable to the conventional mega-oil fields of yesterday.

What is less discussed is that the production of unconventional oil most likely has a (much) lower net energy yield than the production of conventional crude oil. Net energy is commonly defined as the difference between the energy acquired from some source and the energy used to obtain and deliver that energy, measured over a full life cycle (net energy=E(out)- E(in)). A related concept is the energy return on investment (EROI), defined as the ratio of the former to the latter (EROI=E(out)/E(in)). The ‘energy used to obtain energy’, E(in), may be measured in a number of different ways. For example, it may include both the energy used directly during the operation of the relevant energy system (e.g. the energy used for water injection in oil wells) as well as the energy used indirectly in various stages of its life cycle (e.g. the energy required to manufacture the oil rig). Owing to these differences, it is necessary to ensure that the EROI estimates have been derived using similar boundaries, i.e. using the same level of specificity for Ein. Murphy et al. [1] suggested a framework for categorizing various EROI estimates, and, where applicable, I will follow this framework in this paper.

Estimates of EROI are important because they provide a measure of the relative ‘efficiency’ of different energy sources and of the energy system as a whole [2,3]. Since it is this net energy that is important for long-term economic growth [3–6], measuring and tracking the changes in EROI over time may allow us to assess the future growth potential of the global economy in ways that data on production and/or prices cannot.

Over the past few years, there has been a surge in research estimating the EROI of a number of different sources of oil, including global oil and gas [7], US oil and gas [8,9], Norwegian oil and gas [10], ultra-deep-water oil and gas [11]and oil shale[12]. In addition, there have been several publications relating EROI to long-term economic growth, firm profitability and oil prices [3, 13–15].

The main objective of this paper is to use this literature to explain the implications that declining EROI may have for long-term economic growth. Specifically, this paper: (i) provides a brief history of the development of EROI and net energy concepts in the academic literature, (ii) summarizes the most recent estimates of the EROI of oil resources, (iii) assesses the importance of EROI and net energy for economic growth and (iv) discusses the implications of these estimates for the future growth of the global economy.

(a) A brief history of energy return on investment

In the late 1960s, Charles Hall studied the energy flows within New Hope Creek, in North Carolina, USA, to understand the migration patterns of the fish within the stream. His conclusions [16] revealed that, by migrating, the fish were able to exploit new sources of food, which, after accounting for the additional energy cost of migration, conferred a large net energy gain upon the fish. In other words, owing to the abundance of food in the new locations, the fish were able to gain enough energy not only to ‘pay’ for the energy expenditure of that migration but also to grow and reproduce. Comparing the energy gained from migration to the energy expended in the migration process was ostensibly the first calculation of EROI.

In the autumn of 1973 the price of oil skyrocketed following the Arab oil embargo (the so-called ‘first oil shock’), which sent most OECD economies tumbling into recession. The apparent vulnerability of OECD nations to spikes in the price of oil led many researchers to focus on the interaction between the economy and energy. Then, in 1974, the journal Energy Policy dedicated a series of articles to the energy costs of production processes. The editor of this series, Peter Chapman, began the series with a paper titled ‘Energy costs: a review of methods’, and observed that ‘this subject is so new and undeveloped that there is no universally agreed label as yet’ [17], and followed up two years later with a second paper [18]. Today this area of research is spread among a number of different disciplines, including, but not limited to, ecological economics, industrial ecology and net energy analysis, and the EROI statistic is just one of many indicators calculated.

Also during this period researchers started using Leontief input–output tables as a way to measure the use of energy within the economy [19–22]. For example, Bullard & Herendeen [23] used a Leontief-type input–output matrix to calculate the energy intensity (in units of joules per dollar) of every major industrial sector of the US economy. Even today this paper serves as a useful model for other net energy analyses [8,24]. In addition, a workshop in Sweden in 1974 and one at Stanford, CA, in 1975 formalized the methodologies and conventions of energy analysis [25,26].

In 1974, the US Congress enacted specific legislation mandating that net energy be accounted for in energy projects. The Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (NERDA) included a provision stating that ‘the potential for production of net energy by the proposed technology at the stage of commercial application shall be analyzed and considered in evaluating proposals’. Further influential papers by the Colorado Energy Research Institute, Bullardet al.and Herendeen followed this requirement [27–29]. Unfortunately, the net energy provision within the NERDA was never adopted and was eventually dropped.

In 1979, the Iranian revolution led to a cessation of their oil exports (the second oil shock), which precipitated another spike in the price of oil and squeezed an already strained US economy. Responding to this, and in an attempt to control deficits and expenditure, President Reagan of the USA enacted Executive Order 12291 in 1980. This order mandated that ‘regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society from the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society’.


In other words, all US regulatory action had to show a net monetary benefit to US society, and the idea of measuring benefits in terms of net energy fell even further from the policy arena.

Net energy analysis remained insignificant in US energy policy debates until the dispute over corn ethanol emerged 25 years later [30,31].

Although the political emphasis had now shifted towards economic analysis, the 1980s still provided useful papers on net energy analysis (e.g. [32]). In 1981, Hall published ‘Energy return on investment for United States petroleum, coal, and uranium’, which marked the first time that the acronym EROI was published in the academic literature [33]. Later that year, Hall & Cleveland [34] published ‘Petroleum drilling and production in the United States: yield per effort and net energy analysis’. This paper analyzed the amount of energy being produced per foot drilled and found that the ratio had been declining steadily for 30 years. Further publications by Hall and colleagues then tested hypotheses relating economic growth to energy use, introduced explicitly the concept of energy return on investment and examined the EROI of most major sources of energy [35,36].

Following growing concern about environmental impacts, climate change and sustainability, documented in the Brundtland Report in 1987 [37], emphasis began to shift from energy analysis to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and life-cycle analysis. Life-cycle analysis (LCA) itself was born out of the process and input–output analyses codified in the aforementioned energy literature of the 1970s and 1980s, and can be used to calculate EROI and other net energy metrics. Beginning around the turn of the century, researchers began to recognize the complementarity between LCA and net energy and began publishing on the matter [38].

There was another surge in publications in net energy analysis in the 2000s, due mainly to a growing global interest in renewable energy, and therefore an interest in metrics that compare renewable energy technologies. The debate about whether or not corn ethanol has an EROI greater than one is a good example [30,31]. There has also been a number of studies using the input–output techniques developed in the 1970s to track emissions production and/or resource consumption across regions [39].

Today, research within the field of net energy analysis is expanding rapidly. The main renewable energy options, including, but not limited to, solar photovoltaics, concentrating solar, wind power and biofuels, have each been the focus of studies estimating their net energy yield [31,40,41].

Furthermore, with the expansion of oil production into ultra-deep water, tar sands and other unconventional sources, as well as developments with shale gas, there has been a renewed interest in whether or not these sources of energy have EROI ratios similar to conventional oil and gas, and publications are expected to be forthcoming .

Recent estimates of the energy return on (energy) investment for oil and gas production

There has been a recent resurgence in EROI studies for liquid fuels, beginning with Cleveland [ 8], who estimated the EROI for oil and gas extraction in the US, Gagnon et al. [7], who estimated the same EROI for the whole world, and a number of additional studies that were contained in a 2011 special issue of the journal Sustainability. This section reviews the findings of these papers. Unless otherwise noted, all of the oil EROIs reported here are equivalent to the standard EROI (EROIstnd), as reported in Murphy et al. [1], which means that both the indirect and direct costs of energy extraction are included in the EROI calculation, but costs further downstream, such as transportation and refinement, have been omitted.

Cleveland [ 8]estimated two values for the EROI of US oil and gas that differed in the method of aggregating different types of energy carrier. The first method used thermal-equivalent aggregation, i.e. volumes of natural gas and oil are combined in terms of their heat content in joules. The second method uses a Divisia index, developed by Berndt [42], and uses both energy prices and consumption levels to adjust for the ‘quality’ of each energy carrier. Quality corrections are often used in energy analysis to adjust for the varying economic productivity of different energy carriers—for example, since electricity is more valuable, in terms of potential economic productivity, than coal, it is given more weight in the aggregate measure [43]. Quality-corrected measures better reflect the ability of energy carriers to produce marketable goods and services, so are arguably more useful.

The EROI values calculated using the energy quality-corrected data for US oil and gas production are consistently lower than those calculated from the non-quality-corrected data. This reflects the fact that many of the inputs to production are high-quality (i.e. high-priced) energy carriers such as electricity and diesel, while the outputs are unprocessed crude oil and natural gas.

Nevertheless, both estimates show the same trend over time: namely, an increase until the early 1970s, a decline until the mid-1980s, a slight recovery until the mid-1990s, followed again by decline (figure 1).

According to Cleveland, the overall downward trend from the 1970s till the mid-1990s is the result of higher extraction costs due to the depletion of oil in the USA. The up and down fluctuations within this aggregate trend are likely to be linked to changes in oil prices influencing the rate of drilling in the USA, with higher prices encouraging more drilling in less promising areas, which in turn leads to a lower yield and a lower aggregate EROI. Gagnon et al. [7] estimated the EROI for global oil and gas from 1992 to 2006 using the same energy aggregation techniques as Cleveland [8], i.e. both thermal equivalence and Divisia indices. In both cases, the EROI at the wellhead was around 26 in 1992 and increased to 35 in 1999 before declining to 18 in 2006 (figure 1).

It is not surprising that the EROI for global oil and gas is higher than that for the USA considering that oil production peaked in the USA in 1970 due mainly to the depletion of its biggest oil fields, while global production continued to flow and even increase from the mega-oil fields of the Persian Gulf.

US producers are increasingly reliant upon smaller and poorer-quality fields in difficult locations (e.g. deep water) together with the enhanced recovery of oil from existing fields—all of which are relatively energy intensive. In contrast, most OPEC members are still producing oil from high-quality supergiant fields.

The first few years of the Gagnon dataset and the last few years of the Cleveland dataset overlap in the early 1990s and both show a general increasing trend. The results from Gagnon et al. [7] then show that the increase in the early 1990s reaches a maximum in 1999, followed by a monotonic decline through the 2000s. Much like the Cleveland paper, Gagnon et al. assume that the decline is due to the depletion of easy access resources, but, as mentioned earlier, this trend also could be dependent on the trend in oil prices.

In addition to the estimates of Cleveland [ 8] and Gagnon et al. [7], Guilford et al. [9] estimated the non-quality-corrected EROI of conventional oil and gas production for the USA. They found that the EROI of oil production has declined from a peak of 24 in the 1950s to roughly 11 in 2007 (figure 1). By deriving separate estimates for exploration and production, they show how depletion reduces the rate of production from existing fields and gives incentives for increased exploration for new fields, both of which lower the aggregate EROI. They also suggest that natural gas is subsidizing oil production and that the EROI for oil alone is likely to be much lower.

Figure 1. EROI estimates from three sources, Gagnon et al. [7], Cleveland [8] and Guilford et al. [9]. The Gagnon et al. [7] data represent estimates of the EROI for global oil and gas production using aggregation by Divisia indices. The Cleveland [8] data represent the trend in EROI values for US oil and gas production calculated using the Divisia indices to aggregate energy units. The Guilford et al. [9] data represent estimates of the EROI of US oil production from 1919 to 2007

Despite differences in coverage and approach, the results from these three studies are broadly consistent, namely a general increase in EROI until 1970, then a general decline until the early 1980s, an increase through the mid-1990s and then a decline.

Grandell et al. [10] estimated the EROI of oil production from Norwegian oilfields to be roughly 20 in

  1. They also note that as the fields deplete they expect the EROI to decline further. Brandt [44] estimatedthattheEROIfromCalifornianoilfieldshasdeclinedfromover50 in the 1950s to under 10 by the mid-2000s. Similarly, Hu et al. [45] estimated that the EROI from the Daqing oil field, the biggest oil field in China, had declined from 10 in 2001 to 6.5 by 2009.

Two other recent EROI estimates of particular importance are those of Moerschbaecher & Day [11], who estimated the EROI of ultra-deep-water (depths greater than 1524 m or 5000 feet) production in the Gulf of Mexico, and Cleveland & O’Connor [12], who estimated the EROI of oil shale production.

Moerschbaecher & Day [11] estimated the EROI for deep-water oil production to be between 7 and 22. The range in EROI values is due to a sensitivity analysis performed by the authors that incorporated three different energy intensity values as proxies for the energy intensity of the ultra-deep-water oil industry. They also noted that, owing to the large infrastructure requirements of the deep-water oil industry, the real value is probably closer to the lower end of the range presented.

Cleveland & O’Connor [12] estimated that the EROI for oil shale production using either surface retorting or in situ methods was roughly 1.5, much lower than for other unconventional resources. Oil shale is the production of oil from kerogen found in sedimentary rock and is distinct from ‘shale oil’ or, preferably, ‘tight oil’, which is oil trapped in shale or other impermeable rock. Oil shale is discussed here because the western USA has vast resources of oil shale, but production costs are much higher than for other forms of unconventional oil [46].

The following summarizes the aforementioned studies:

  • EROI 11: average for US oil production today, down from roughly 20 in the early 1970s
  • EROI 17: global average, down from EROI of roughly 30 in 2000
  • EROI 10: ultra-deep-water oil production is probably less than 10
  • EROI 1.5: Oil shale (kerogen), not tight oil (aka ‘shale’ oil)

Energy return on (energy) investment, oil prices, and economic growth

The economic crash of 2008 occurred during the same month that oil prices peaked at an all-time high of $147 per barrel, leading to numerous studies that suggested a causal link between the two [47,48]. In addition, other researchers involved in net energy analysis began examining how EROI relates to both the price of oil and economic growth [3,13,15,49–51].

Murphy & Hall [3] examined the relation between EROI, oil price and economic growth over the past 40 years and found that economic growth occurred during periods that combined low oil prices with an increasing oil supply. They also found that high oil prices led to an increase in energy expenditures as a share of GDP, which has led historically to recessions. Lastly, they found that oil prices and EROI are inversely related (figure 2), which implies that increasing the oil supply by exploiting unconventional and hence lower EROI sources of oil would require high oil prices. This created what Murphy & Hall called the ‘economic growth paradox: increasing the oil supply to support economic growth will require high oil prices that will undermine that economic growth’.

Other researchers have come to similar conclusions to those of Murphy & Hall, most notably economist

James Hamilton [47]. Recently, Kopits [50], and later Nelder & Macdonald [49], reiterated the importance of the relation between oil prices and economic growth in what they describe as a ‘narrow ledge’ of oil prices. This is the idea that the range, or ledge, of oil prices that are profitable for oil producers but not so high as to hinder economic growth is narrowing as newer oil resources require high oil prices for development, and as economies begin to contract due largely to the effects of prolonged periods of high oil prices. In other words, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the oil industry to increase supply at low prices, since most of the new oil being brought online has a low EROI. Therefore, if we can only increase oil supply through low EROI resources, then oil prices must apparently rise to meet the cost, thus restraining economic growth.

Skrebowski [51]provides another interpretation of the relation between oil prices and economic growth in what he calls the ‘effective incremental oil supply cost. It should be noted there are wide divergences in estimates of oil development costs depending on what is included and the treatment of financial costs, profits and overheads. Those used here are estimates of the prices needed to justify a new, large development.’

According to data provided by Skrebowski, developing new unconventional oil production in Canada (i.e. tar sands) requires an oil price between $70 and $90 per barrel. Skrebowski also indicates that new production from ultra-deep-water areas requires prices between $70 and $80 per barrel. In other words, to increase oil production over the next few years from such resources will require oil prices above at least $70 per barrel. These oil prices may seem normal today considering that the market price for reference crude West-Texas Intermediate ranged from $78 to $110 per barrel in 2012 alone, but we should remember that the average oil price during periods of economic growth over the past 40 years was under $40 per barrel, and the average price during economic recessions was under $60 per barrel (dollar values inflation adjusted to 2010) [3]. What these data indicate is that the floor price at which we could increase oil production in the short term would require, at a minimum, prices that are correlated historically with economic recessions.

Heun & de Wit [15] found indicates that the price of oil increases exponentially as EROI declines [equation and explanation snipped, see pdf]. They suggest that the nature of the relation between EROI and the price is such that the effect on price becomes highly nonlinear as EROI declines below 10.

Figure 2. Relationship between oil prices and EROI. (Adapted from Murphy & Hall [3].)

King & Hall [13] examined the relation between EROI, oil prices and the potential profitability of oil-producing firms, termed energy-producing entities (EPEs). They found that for an EPE to receive a 10% financial rate of return from an energy extraction process, which, for example, has an EROI of 11, would require an oil price of roughly $20 per barrel.3 Alternatively, a 100% financial rate of return for the same extraction project would require $60 per barrel (figure 3). King & Hall also echoed Heun & de Wit, suggesting that the relationship between EROI and profitability becomes nonlinear when the EROI declines below 10.

The pertinent results from the literature summarized in this subsection are as follows:

  • there appears to be a negative exponential relationship between the aggregate EROI of oil production and oil prices;
  • there appears to be a comparable relationship between EROI and the potential profitability of oil-producing firms;
  • the relationship between EROI and profitability appears to become nonlinear as the EROI declines below 10;
  • the minimum oil price needed to increase global oil supply in the near-term is comparable to that which has triggered economic recessions in the past.

Understanding the relationship between energy return on (energy) investment and net energy

The mathematical relation between EROI, net energy and gross energy can be used to explain why, at around an EROI of 10, the relation between EROI and most other variables, such as price, economic growth and profitability, becomes nonlinear. The following equation describes the relation between EROI, gross and net energy [3]:

Equation 3.2 net energy = gross energy (1 – 1/ EROI)

Figure 3. Oil price as a function of EROI. The lines on the figure correspond to various rates of monetary return on investment (MROI). (Adapted from King & Hall [13].)

Using this equation, we can estimate the net energy provided to society from a particular energy source or (rearranging) the amount of gross energy required to provide a certain amount of net energy [52].

We can interpret equation (3.2) as follows:

  • an EROI of 10 delivers to society 90% (1 – .2 = 90%) of the gross energy extracted as net energy
  • an EROI of 5 will deliver to society 80% (1 – .2 = 80%)
  • an EROI of 2 will deliver only 50% (1 – .5 = 50%).

This exponential relation between gross and net energy means that there is little difference in the net energy provided to society by an energy source with an EROI above 10, whether it is 11 or 100, but a very large difference in the net energy provided to society by an energy source with an EROI of 10 and one with an EROI of 5. This exponential relation between gross and net energy flows has been called the ‘net energy cliff’ [53]and it is the main reason why there is a critical point in the relation between EROI and price at an EROI of about 10 (figure 4).

Figure 4. The 'net energy cliff' graph, showing the relation between net energy and EROI. As EROI declines, the net energy as a percentage of total energy extracted declines exponentially. Note that the x-axis is in reverse order. (Adapted from Mearns [53].)

Calculating the minimum energy return on (energy) investment at the point of energy acquisition for a sustainable society

‘The true value of energy to society is the net energy, which is that after the energy costs of getting and concentrating that energy are subtracted.’ H. T. Odum [6]

According to equation (3.2), as EROI declines, the net energy provided to society declines as well, and, at some point, the amount of net energy will be insufficient to meet existing demand.

The point at which the EROI provides just enough net energy to society to sustain current activity represents the minimum EROI for a sustainable society.

But estimating empirically the actual minimum EROI for society is challenging. Hall et al. [24] estimated that the minimum EROI required to sustain the vehicle transportation system of the USA was 3. Since their calculation included only the energy costs of maintaining the transportation system, it is reasonable to expect that the minimum EROI for society as a whole could be much higher.

Exploring the minimum EROI for a sustainable society is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will examine how, in theory, the minimum EROI could be calculated by using some simple models. I will first do this by examining how the idea of net energy grew from analyzing the energy budgets of organisms.

The energy that an organism acquires from its food is its gross energy intake. Let us assume, for simplicity’s sake, that an organism consumed 10 units of gross energy, but to access this food it expended 5 units of energy. Given these parameters, the EROI is 2 (=10/5) and the net energy is 5. It is important to note that the expended energy created an energy deficit (5 units) that must be repaid from the gross energy intake (10 units) before any growth, for example, in the form of building fat reserves or reproduction, can take place.

An economy also must have an influx of net energy to grow. Let us assume that Economy A produces 10,000 units of energy at an EROI of 10, which means that the energy cost of acquisition is 1,000 units and the net energy is 9,000. Like organisms, economies also have energy requirements that must be met before any investments in growth can be made. Indeed, researchers are now measuring the ‘metabolism of society’ by mapping energy consumption and flow patterns over time [54]. For example, economies must invest energy simply to maintain transportation and building infrastructure, to provide food and security, as well as to provide energy for direct consumption in transportation vehicles, households and business, etc. The energy flow to society must first pay all of these metabolic energy costs before enabling growth, such as constructing new buildings, roads, etc.

Building off this idea of societal metabolism, we can gain additional insight into the relationship between EROI and economic growth by differentiating between 3 main uses of energy by society:

  1. Metabolism, which could be described as the energy and material costs associated with the maintenance and replacement of populations and capital depreciation (examples include food consumption, bridge repair or doctor visits)
  2. Consumption: the expenditure of energy that does not increase populations or capital accumulation and is not necessary for metabolism (examples include purchasing movie tickets or plane tickets for vacation; in general, items purchased with disposable income)
  3. Growth, the investment of energy and materials in new populations and capital over and above that necessary for metabolism (examples include building new houses, purchasing new cars, increasing populations).

Figure 5. (a-d) Flow diagrams relating net energy, EROI and gross energy production for a hypothetical Economy A. Each diagram describes the energy flows according to a different EROI, where the EROI is (a) 10, (b) 5, (c) 2 and (d) 1.5

Figure 5 (a-d) illustrates how the flows of energy to the three categories change as EROI declines. Let us assume that the metabolism of Economy A requires the consumption of 5000 units of energy per year. So, of the 10,000 units of energy extracted, 1,000 must be reinvested to produce the next 10,000, and another 5,000 are invested to maintain the infrastructure of Economy A. This leaves 4,000 units of net energy that could be invested in either consumption or growth (figure 5a).

As society transitions to lower EROI energy sources, a portion of net energy that was historically used for consumption and/or growth will be transferred to the energy extraction sector. This transfer decreases the growth and consumption potential of the economy. For example, let us assume that, as energy extraction becomes more difficult in Economy A, it requires an additional 1,000 units of energy (2,000 total) to maintain its current production of gross energy, decreasing the EROI from 10 to 5 and the net energy from 9,000 to 8,000. If the metabolism of the economy remains at 5,000 units of energy, Economy A now has only 3,000 units of energy to invest in growth and/or consumption (figure 5b).

If the EROI for society were to decline to 2, the amount of energy that could previously be invested in growth and consumption would be transferred completely to the energy extraction sector. Thus, given the assumed metabolic needs of Economy A in this example, an EROI of 2 would be the minimum EROI needed to provide enough energy to pay for the current infrastructure requirements of Economy A, or, to put it another way, an EROI of 2 would be the minimum EROI for a sustainable Economy A. If the EROI were to decline below 2, for example in some biofuel systems [31], then the net energy provided to society would not be enough to maintain the infrastructure of Economy A, resulting in physical degradation and economic contraction (figure 5d).

There are a few caveats to this discussion of the minimum EROI that need to be addressed. First, it is important to remember that this is a simple example with hypothetical numbers, and, as such, the minimum EROI for our current society is probably, and maybe substantially, higher. Second, over time, efficiency improvements within the economy can mitigate the impact that lower EROI resources have on economic growth by increasing the utility of energy. That said, the exact relation between energy efficiency improvements and declining EROI is yet to be determined. Third, the model assumes that metabolic needs will be met first, then consumption and growth. This may not necessarily be the case.

It is quite possible that there could be growth at the expense of meeting metabolic needs. Likewise, we can consume at the expense of growth or metabolism. Either way, the net energy deficit that results from declining EROI will become apparent in one of the three sectors of energy use.

The gross energy requirement ratio

‘Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.’ The Red Queen, in Through the looking-glass [55,p.15]

Another way to explore the impact that a decline in EROI can have on net energy flows to society is to consider the ‘gross energy requirement ratio’ (GERR). The GERR indicates the proportional increase or decrease in gross energy production that is required to maintain the net energy flow to society given a change in the EROI of the energy acquisition process. The GERR is calculated by dividing the gross energy requirement (GER) of the substitute energy source by the GER of the reference energy source.

The GER is the minimum amount of gross energy production required to produce one unit of net energy.

Both of these equations are outlined below [2]:

Equation 5.1 GER(X) = EROI(X) / EROI(X) – 1

Equation 5.2 GERR = GER(X) / GER(REF)

The GERR is most useful when examining how transitioning from high to low EROI energy sources will impact the net energy flow to society. For example, the average barrel of oil in the USA is produced at an EROI of roughly 11 [9]. Using equation (5.1), an EROI of 11 results in a GER of 1.1, i.e. 1.1 units of gross energy must be extracted to deliver 1 unit of net energy to society, with the 0.1 extra being the amount of energy required for the extraction process. For comparison, delivering one unit of net energy from an oil source with an EROI of 5 would require the extraction of 1.25 units of oil. If conventional oil at an EROI of 11 is our reference GER, and our substitute energy resource has an EROI of 5, then the GERR is 1.14. This GERR value indicates that, if society were to transition from an energy source with an EROI of 11 to one with an EROI of 5, then gross energy production would have to increase by 14% simply to maintain the same net energy flow to society. The net effect of declining EROI is to increase the GERR, requiring the extraction of larger quantities of gross energy simply to sustain the same net energy flow to society (figure 6).

Implications for the future of economic growth

The implication of these arguments is that, if we try to pursue growth by using sources of energy of lower EROI, perhaps by transitioning to unconventional fossil fuels, long-term economic growth will become harder to achieve and come at an increasingly higher financial, energetic and environmental cost.

Figure 6. The GERR as a function of declining EROI. In this example, the reference EROI was 11. As such, the GERR value associated with an EROI of 4 represents the proportional increase in gross energy required to deliver one unit of net energy if society transitioned from an energy source with an EROI of 11 to one with an EROI of 4.

Revolutionary technological advancement is really the only way in which unconventional oil can be produced with a high EROI, and thus enhance the prospects for long-term economic growth and reduce the associated financial, energetic and environmental costs. This technological advancement would have to increase the energy efficiency of unconventional oil extraction or allow for increased oil recovery from fields discovered already [56]. Alternatively, there could be massive substitution from oil to high EROI renewables such as wind or hydropower [57].

It is difficult to assess directly how much technological progress is being or will be made by an industry, but we can get a glimpse as to how the oil industry is faring by comparing how production is responding to effort. If new technological advancements, such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, represent the types of revolutionary technological breakthroughs that are needed, then we should at least see production increasing relative to effort. The data, however, do not indicate that this is the case. From 1987 to 2000, when the US oil industry increased the number of rigs used to produce oil, there was, as expected, a corresponding increase in the amount of oil produced (figure 7 not shown, see paper). But from 2001 to 2012 the trend shows very little correlation between drilling effort and oil production.

Biofuels are the only currently available non-fossil substitute for oil that is being produced at any sizable scale, but factors such as economic cost, land-use requirements and competition with food production restrict their potential contribution (see [58]). Most importantly, the EROI of most large-scale biofuels5 is between 1 and 3 [30,31], which means that we would be substituting towards a fuel that is even less useful, from a net energy perspective, for long-term economic growth. Others claim that substituting towards renewable electricity is the key; for example, Jacobson & Delucchi [59] argue that wind and solar energy could power global society by 2030. Even if their analysis stands up to scrutiny (and some claim that it does not [60,61]), the high price of oil in the transition period may provide a significant constraint on economic growth. Without high levels of economic growth, the investment capital needed to build, install and operate renewable energy will be hard to acquire.

The other option is to construct coal-to-liquids (CTL) or gas-to-liquids (GTL) operations, but even these solutions have their own difficulties (see [62]). For example, both CTL and GTL operations represent an energy conversion process, not an energy extraction process, which, in terms of EROI, simply adds to the cost of producing the final fuel and lowers the overall EROI. CTL and/or GTL will most probably lead to a significant increase in GHG emissions [63]. For GTL, there is a narrow window of low gas prices and high oil prices in which the GTL process can remain profitable [63]. Achieving profitability is easier in a CTL operation because of cheap coal, but the future availability, quality and cost of that resource is also becoming uncertain [64]. And, again, it will most probably be decades until any sizable portion of global demand for oil is met from a series of GTL or CTL plants, and in the mean-time economies will still be struggling to grow in a high oil price, low oil EROI environment.

Lastly, increasing oil production from low EROI resources is expected to degrade the global environment at an accelerated rate, for two main reasons. First, on average, the environmental impact per unit of energy is larger for unconventional oil than for conventional oil. GHG emissions, for example, are somewhere between 15% and 60% higher for gasoline and diesel produced from tar sands when compared to that produced from conventional petroleum [65,66]. Similarly, the water used per unit of energy produced is also much higher for most low EROI sources of energy [67]. Second, declining EROI increases the GERR. As society switches to lower EROI resources, simply maintaining the flow of net energy to society will require a proportionally larger amount of gross energy extraction, thus increasing the environmental impact associated with that extraction. This evidence indicates that the environmental impacts of energy extraction are most probably related exponentially to EROI, mimicking the relation between EROI and price (figure 8). This relationship holds as long as the flow of net energy to society remains the same or even increases despite a decrease in EROI. The relationship weakens if, when met with lower EROI resources, we simply decrease our effort in energy acquisition, i.e. embrace conservation.

The ecology of societal succession

‘Energy fixed tends to be balanced by the energy cost of maintenance in the mature or “climax” ecosystem.’ E. P. Odum [68]

Societal succession from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution to today mimics ecosystem succession in important and illuminating ways. The early stages of ecosystem development are marked by rapid growth (figure 9a), where the energy fixed through photosynthesis (gross photosynthesis) is greater than the energy consumed through respiration, resulting in a gain of net energy in the ecosystem. This gain in net energy leads to the accumulation of biomass (the energy equivalent of biomass in the context of society is embodied energy). As Odum [68] observed, as succession occurs, the gross photosynthesis of the ecosystem tends to balance with respiration as the steady-state, or ‘climax’, successional stage is reached. In other words, in the climax stage, almost all of the energy fixed by the ecosystem is used in maintenance respiration by the biomass that has accumulated over the years.

The simple diagram of forest succession (figure 9a not shown)is reflected by societal succession (figure 9b not shown)since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution until today. Figure 9 shows how gross photosynthesis is equivalent to humanity’s gross energy production-i.e. the total biomass, coal, oil, natural gas, etc. produced each year. Forest respiration is the equivalent of societal metabolism-i.e. the energy and material costs associated with the maintenance and replacement of populations and capital depreciation. The accumulation of biomass is the equivalent of societal growth-i.e. investments in populations and infrastructure that will increase overall societal metabolism. Lastly, the net energy provided to society is that left after accounting for the metabolic needs of society (i.e. net energy = gross energy production – societal metabolism). Historically, we have simply found and produced more energy as the metabolism (i.e. energy demand) of society grew. Indeed, the exponential increase in global economic output over the past 200 years is highly correlated with the same exponential increase in energy consumption (figure 10).

The question is: can global society continue to produce enough energy to outpace the increased metabolic requirements of a growing, and now very large, built infrastructure? Answering this question for each energy source is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but the answer for oil seems clear, as the production of conventional oil seems to have peaked in 2008 [71], and both unconventional oil and other feasible substitutes have a much lower EROI. Both of these factors are likely to place contractionary pressure on the global economy by decreasing the flow of net energy to society.

The main difference between society and nature, in terms of figure 9, is in the reason for the peak and initial decline in gross energy acquisition. In forests and other natural ecosystems, the amount of gross photosynthesis declines and reaches parity with respiration as the forces of competition and natural selection create a steady-state, or ‘climax’, ecosystem. These forces exist also for society, but they are in the form of declining EROI, geological depletion, environmental degradation, climate change, water pollution, air pollution, land-cover change and such, and all the other factors that are occurring today that make it harder and harder to produce energy easily. In the end, ecosystems are able to successfully transition from a growth-oriented structure to a steady state; it is unclear whether society will be able to do the same.

Figure 10. GDP as a function of energy consumption over the past 200 years. (Adapted from Kremmer [69] and Smil [70].)


The concept of energy return on investment (EROI) was born out of ecological research in the early 1970s, and has grown over the past 30 years into an area of study that bridges the disciplines of industrial ecology, economics, ecology, geography and geology, just to name a few. The most recent estimates indicate that the EROI of conventional oil is between 10 and 20 globally, with an average of 11 in the USA.

The future of oil production resides in unconventional oil, which has, on average, higher production costs (in terms of both money and energy) than conventional oil, and should prove in time to have a (much) lower EROI than conventional oil. Similar comments apply to other substitutes such as biofuels. The lack of peer-reviewed estimates of the EROI of such resources indicates a clear need for further investigation.

Transitioning to lower EROI energy sources has a number of implications for global society.

  1. It will reallocate energy that was previously destined for society towards the energy industry alone. This will, over the long run, lower the net energy available to society, creating significant headwinds for economic growth.
  2. Transitioning to lower EROI oil means that the price of oil will remain high compared to the past, which will also place contractionary pressure on the economy.
  3. As we try to increase oil supplies from unconventional sources, we will accelerate the resource acquisition rate, and therefore the degradation of our natural environment.

It is important to realize that the problems related to declining EROI are not easily solved. Renewable energy may indeed represent the future of energy development, but renewables are a long time off from displacing oil. Lastly, it seems apparent that the supply-side solutions (more oil, renewable energy, etc.) will not be sufficient to offset the impact that declining EROI has on economic growth. All of this evidence indicates that it is time to re-examine the pursuit of economic growth at all costs, and maybe examine how we can reduce demand for oil while trying to maintain and improve quality of life. A good summary of these problems is also given in Sorrell [72].

For society, we can either dictate our own energy future by enacting smart energy policies that recognize the clear and real limits to our own growth, or we can let those limits be dictated to us by the physical constraints of declining EROI. Either way, both the natural succession of ecosystems on Earth anddeclining EROI of oil production indicate that we should expect the economic growth rates of the next 100 years to look nothing like those of the last 100 years.


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23 02 2015

Be prepared to be regaled by truly stunning photography, even when it’s ugly…..  A must watch film.  Anyone who enjoys their cushy lifestyle needs to know at what cost.  Share widely.

We are living in exceptional times. Scientists tell us that we have 10 years to change the way we live, avert the depletion of natural resources and the catastrophic evolution of the Earth’s climate.

The stakes are high for us and our children. Everyone should take part in the effort, and HOME has been conceived to take a message of mobilization out to every human being.

For this purpose, HOME needs to be free. A patron, the PPR Group, made this possible. EuropaCorp, the distributor, also pledged not to make any profit because Home is a non-profit film.

HOME has been made for you : share it! And act for the planet.

Yann Arthus-Bertrand

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