What’s happened to Peak Oil since Peak Oil….

2 10 2018

The latest news that Mexico has this month switched from being a net oil exporter to a net oil importer prompted me to do some more research on what stage we all are with Peak Oil…….  and as expected, the news are not good. Since the peak of conventional oil in 2005, ALL the major producing nations except for Iraq and the US have been producing less and less in real terms, and let’s face it, half the US’ production is unviable shale oil which since the GFC has lost the oil industry $280 billion and counting…..

Meanwhile, pundits on TV are expressing disbelief at how the price of fuel is skyrocketing in Australia (with our dollar struggling to remain above $US0.70) while oil is simultaneously surging under all sorts of pressures.

Crude_prod_changes_2005-May_2018Fig 2: Crude production changes between 2005 and 2018 by country

Group A
Countries where average oil production Jan-May 2018 was lower than the average in 2005. At the bottom is Mexico with the highest rate of decline. This group started to peak in 1997, entering a long bumpy production plateau at around 25 mb/d, ending – you guessed it – in 2005. This is down now to 16 mb/d, a decline of 700 kb/d pa (-2.8% pa).

Decline-group_1994-May2018Fig 3: Group A countries

Group B

Countries where average oil production Jan-May 2018 was higher than the average in 2005. At the top of the stack are Iraq and the US, where growth was highest. Group B compensated for the decline in group A and provided for growth above the red dashed line in Fig 1.
The 2018 data have not been seasonally adjusted.
In group B we have a subgroup of countries which peaked after 2005

Crude_post-2005-peaking_1994-May2018Fig 4: Countries peaking after 2005

A production plateau above 7 mb/d lasted for 6 years between 2010 and 2016. The average was 7.1 mb/d, around +1.8 mb/d higher than in 2005. Another country in this subgroup is China, here shown separately because of its importance and consequences.

Cumulative_crude_prod_changes_2005-May_2018Fig 13: Cumulative crude production changes since 2005

This is a cumulative curve of Fig 2 with changes in ascending order (from negative to positive). On the left, declining production from group A adds up to -9 mb/d (column at Ecuador). Then moving to the right, countries with growing production reduce the cumulative (still negative) until the system is in balance (column at Canada). Only Iraq and the US provide for growth.

According to Crude Oil Peak, where all the above charts came from, the only viable conclusion is…..:

Assuming that the balancing act between declining and growing countries continues (from Mexico through to Canada) the whole system will peak when the US shale oil peaks (in the Permian) as a result of geology or other factors and/or lack of finance in the next credit crunch and when Iraq peaks due to social unrest or other military confrontation in the oil producing Basra region. There are added risks from continuing disruptions in Nigeria and Libya, steeper declines in Venezuela and the impact of sanctions on Iran.

Assuming that the balancing act between declining and growing countries continues (from Mexico through to Canada) the whole system will peak when the US shale oil peaks (in the Permian) as a result of geology or other factors and/or lack of finance in the next credit crunch and when Iraq peaks due to social unrest or other military confrontation in the oil producing Basra region. There are added risks from continuing disruptions in Nigeria and Libya, steeper declines in Venezuela and the impact of sanctions on Iran.

To top it off, here’s a video clip of this guy I’ve never heard of before but which, whilst not peak oil specific, seems on the money to me…….

Advertisements




Areas Of The World More Vulnerable To Collapse

16 06 2018

ANOTHER great post from SRSrocco…..  this one should be of particular interest to Australians though, because we are in a more vulnerable region…. and while Australia may look not too bad on those charts, it’s only because our relatively small population means we consume way less than most of the other nations of the Asia Pacific region…

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Certain areas of the world are more vulnerable to economic and societal collapse.  While most analysts gauge the strength or weakness of an economy based on its outstanding debt or debt to GDP ratio, there is another factor that is a much better indicator.  To understand which areas and regions of the world that will suffer a larger degree of collapse than others, we need to look at their energy dynamics.

For example, while the United States is still the largest oil consumer on the planet, it is no longer the number one oil importer.  China surpassed the United States by importing a record 8.9 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2017.  This data came from the recently released BP 2018 Statistical Review.  Each year, BP publishes a report that lists each countries’ energy production and consumption figures.

BP also lists the total oil production and consumption for each area (regions and continents).  I took BP’s figures and calculated the Net Oil Exports for each area.  As we can see, the Middle East has the highest amount of net oil exports with 22.3 million barrels per day in 2017:

The figures in the chart above are shown in “thousand barrels per day.”  Russia and CIS (Commonwealth Independent States) came in second with 10 mbd of net oil exports followed by Africa with 4 mbd and Central and South America with 388,000 barrels per day.  The areas with the negative figures are net oil importers.

The area in the world with the largest net oil imports was the Asia-Pacific region at 26.6 mbd followed by Europe with 11.4 mbd and North America (Canada, USA & Mexico) at 4.1 mbd.

Now, that we understand the energy dynamics shown in the chart above, the basic rule of thumb is that the areas in the world that are more vulnerable to collapse are those with the highest amount of net oil imports.  Of course, it is true that the Middle Eastern or African countries with significant oil exports can suffer a collapse due to geopolitics and civil wars (example, Iraq, and Libya), but this was not a result of domestic oil supply and demand forces.  Rather the collapse of Iraq and Libya can be blamed on certain superpowers’ desire to control the oil market as they are strategic net oil importers.

The areas with the largest net oil imports, Asia-Pacific and Europe, have designed complex economies that are highly dependent on significant oil supplies to function.  Thus, the areas and countries with the largest net oil imports will experience a higher degree of collapse. Yes, there’s more to it than the amount of net oil imports, but that is an easy gauge to use.   I will explain the other factors shortly.  If we look at the Asia-Pacific countries with the largest net oil imports, China, India, and Japan lead the pack:

China is a net importer of nearly 9 mbd of oil, followed by India at 4 mbd and Japan with 3.9 mbd.  Thus, as these net oil imports decline, so will the degree of economic activity.  However, when net oil imports fall to a certain level, then a more sudden collapse of the economy will result… resembling the Seneca Cliff.

We must remember, a great deal of the economic infrastructure (Skyscrapers, commercial buildings, retail stores, roads, equipment, buses, trucks, automobiles, etc etc.) only function if a lot of oil continually runs throughout the system.  Once the oil supply falls to a certain level, then the economic system disintegrates.

While China is the largest net oil importer, the United States is still the largest consumer of oil in the world.  Being the largest oil consumer is another very troubling sign.  The next chart shows the countries with the highest oil consumption in the world and their percentage of net oil imports:

Due to the rapid increase in domestic shale oil production, the United States net oil imports have fallen drastically over the past decade.  At one point, the U.S. was importing nearly three-quarters (75%) of its oil but is now only importing 34%.  Unfortunately, this current situation will not last for long.  As quickly as shale oil production surged, it will decline in the same fashion… or even quicker.

You will notice that Saudi Arabia is the sixth largest oil consumer in the world followed by Russia.  Both Saudi Arabia and Russia export a much higher percentage of oil than they consume.  However, Russia will likely survive a much longer than Saudi Arabia because Russia can provide a great deal more than just oil.  Russia and the Commonwealth Independent States can produce a lot of food, goods, commodities, and metals domestically, whereas Saudi Arabia must import most of these items.

Of the largest consumers of oil in the chart above, Japan and South Korea import 100% (or nearly 100%) of their oil needs.  According to the data put out by BP 2018 Statistical Review, they did not list any individual oil production figures for Japan or South Korea.  However, the U.S. Energy Information Agency reported in 2015 that Japan produced 139,000 bd of total petroleum liquids while S. Korea supplied 97,000 bd.  Production of petroleum liquids from Japan and South Korea only account for roughly 3% of their total consumption…. peanuts.

Analysts or individuals who continue to believe the United States will become energy independent are ignorant of the impacts of Falling EROI – Energy Returned On Investment or the Thermodynamics of oil depletion.  Many analysts believe that if the price of oil gets high enough, say $100 or $150; then shale oil would be hugely profitable.  The error in their thinking is the complete failure to comprehend this simple relationship… that as oil prices rise, SO DO the COSTS… 

Do you honestly believe a trucking company that transports fracking sand, water or oil for the shale oil industry is going to provide the very same costs when the oil price doubles????  We must remember, the diesel price per gallon increases significantly as the oil price moves higher.  Does the energy analyst believe the trucking companies are just going to eat that higher cost for the benefit of the shale oil industry??  This is only one example, but as the oil price increases, inflationary costs will thunder throughout the shale oil industry.

If the oil price shoots up to $100 or higher and stays there (which I highly doubt), then costs will start to surge once again for the shale oil industry.  As costs increase, we can kiss goodbye the notion of higher shale oil profits.  But as I mentioned in the brackets, I don’t see the oil price jumping to $100 and staying there.  Yes, we could see an oil price spike, but not a long-term sustained price as the current economic cycle is getting ready to roll over.  And with it, we are going to experience one hell of a deflationary collapse.  This will take the oil price closer to $30 than $100.

Regardless, the areas and countries with the highest oil consumption and net oil imports will be more vulnerable to collapse and will fall the hardest.  Just imagine the U.S. economy consuming 5 million barrels of oil per day, rather than the current 20 mbd.  The United States just has more stuff that will become worthless and dysfunctional than other countries.

Lastly, the end game suggests that the majority of countries will experience an economic collapse due to the upcoming rapid decline in global oil production.  However, some countries will likely be able to transition better than others, as the leverage and complexity of the economies aren’t as dependent on oil as the highly advanced Western and Eastern countries.





It’s the nett energy George…..

7 02 2016

George-Monbiot-L

George Monbiot

George Monbiot has written another piece on the current oil situation, but whilst I agree mostly with what he says, he still doesn’t ‘get it’………

Oil, the industry that threatens us with destruction, is being bailed out with public money

By George Monbiot, published in the Guardian 3rd February 2016

Those of us who predicted, during the first years of this century, an imminent peak in global oil supplies could not have been more wrong. People like the energy consultant Daniel Yergin, with whom I disputed the topic, appear to have been right: growth, he said, would continue for many years, unless governments intervened.

Oil appeared to peak in the United States in 1970, after which production fell for 40 years. That, we assumed, was the end of the story. But through fracking and horizontal drilling, production last year returned to the level it reached in 1969. Twelve years ago, the Texas oil tycoon T. Boone Pickens announced that “never again will we pump more than 82 million barrels”. By the end of 2015, daily world production reached 97 million.

Following one of those links, I have to admit, surprised me…..  I had no idea the US’ oil production had almost reached its 1970 peak….. I may have confused how much they were extracting with what they were consuming. And, that chart is already out of date, the extraction rate is now in freefall…

usoilprod

What everyone who comments on this fails to say is that whilst the numbers of barrels tabled in their spreadsheets might well be there, and they may be following the money, absolutely nobody is following the nett number of Megajoules.  A barrel of oil from the last dot on the above chart may well contain less than a quarter of the nett energy content of one from a dot at the toe of the curve.

George then adds….:

Saudi Arabia has opened its taps, to try to destroy the competition and sustain its market share: a strategy that some peak oil advocates once argued was impossible.

Methinks he should visit Gail Tverberg’s site for proper analysis….

saudiexport

Saudi Arabia has been pumping flat out for years, with no discernible market flooding power.  It may in fact be trying very hard to meet its own fast growing domestic demand which is having an obvious impact on how much it is exporting, which is discernably less than it was way back in 1980……. so how can you blame them for flooding the market?

George continues with…..:

Instead of a collapse in the supply of oil, we confront the opposite crisis: we’re drowning in the stuff. The reasons for the price crash – an astonishing slide from $115 a barrel to $30 over the past 20 months – are complex: among them are weaker demand in China and a strong dollar. But an analysis by the World Bank finds that changes in supply have been a much greater factor than changes in demand.

Whilst Gail Tverberg says…..:

Some people talk about peak energy (or oil) supply. They expect high prices and more demand than supply. Other people talk about energy demand hitting a peak many years from now, perhaps when most of us have electric cars.

Neither of these views is correct. The real situation is that we right now seem to be reaching peak energy demand through low commodity prices. I see evidence of this in the historical energy data recently updated by BP (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015).

Growth in world energy consumption is clearly slowing. In fact, growth in energy consumption was only 0.9% in 2014. This is far below the 2.3% growth we would expect, based on recent past patterns. In fact, energy consumption in 2012 and 2013 also grew at lower than the expected 2.3% growth rate (2012 – 1.4%; 2013 – 1.8%).

Figure 1- Resource consumption by part of the world. Canada etc. grouping also includes Norway, Australia, and South Africa. Based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 data.

Recently, I wrote that economic growth eventually runs into limits. The symptoms we should expect are similar to the patterns we have been seeing recently (Why We Have an Oversupply of Almost Everything (Oil, labor, capital, etc.)). It seems to me that the patterns in BP’s new data are also of the kind that we would expect to be seeing, if we are hitting limits that are causing low commodity prices.

Of course, people like George who want to keep growth going, only using wind and nuclear power, don’t understand we are hitting limits.

When oil hit $147 at the time of the GFC, it literally bankrupted the economy. Having hit peak conventional oil, trillions of dollars had to be invested (read, borrowed…) to capitalise on the much higher hanging and less energetic fruit. Which made us get less with more, when we should be doing the exact opposite, doing more with less…..

George then has a big whinge about fossil subsidies at the expense of renewables.  The way I see it however, is that as all renewables are manufactured with fossil fuels, as they get cheaper, the costs of making the renewables also goes down, so that to some extent, any fossil subsidy is a hidden renewables subsidy…..  Furthermore, without further subsidies, oil and coal companies will go bust to which George says….:

A falling oil price drags down the price of gas, exposing coal mining companies to the risk of bankruptcy: good riddance to them.

Which, George, unfortunately also means good riddance to renewables….  He then ends with…….:

So they lock us into the 20th Century, into industrial decline and air pollution, stranded assets and – through climate change – systemic collapse. Governments of this country cannot resist the future forever. Eventually they will succumb to the inexorable logic, and recognise that most of the vast accretions of fossil plant life in the Earth’s crust must be left where they are. And those massive expenditures of public money will prove to be worthless.

Crises expose corruption: that is one of the basic lessons of politics. The oil price crisis finds politicians with their free-market trousers round their ankles. When your friends are in trouble, the rigours imposed religiously upon the poor and public services suddenly turn out to be negotiable. Throw money at them, trash their competitors, rig the outcome: those who deserve the least receive the most.

At last……  George recognises systemic collapse, for all the wrong reasons unfortunately. It may look like corruption to him, but it sure as hell looks like limits to growth to me.





More signs the deflationary spiral is upon us

11 11 2015

I’m feeling poorly this morning, the victim of some bug apparently doing the rounds in my neck of the woods. Ute I is having minor repairs done to pass the safety certificate it needs to have its new shiny Tassie plates screwed to its bumper bars, so I’m taking the time to do a bit more blogging.

This scary item from Zerohedge turned up in my inbox the other day, and it really rattled my cage…….  All the ducks are lining up on the wall… I better start spending the proceeds from selling Mon Abri quick smart.

It’s no secret that Beijing has an excess capacity problem.

Indeed, the idea that a yearslong industrial buildup intended to support

i) the expansion of the smokestack economy,

ii) a real estate boom, and

iii) robust worldwide demand ultimately served to create a supply glut in China is one of the key narratives when it comes to analyzing the global macro picture.

That, combined with ZIRP’s uncanny ability to keep uneconomic producers in business, has served to drive down commodity prices the world over, imperiling many an emerging market and driving a bevy of drillers, diggers, and pumpers to the brink of insolvency.

As we noted late last month, if you want to get a read on just how acute the situation truly is, look no further than China’s “ghost cities”…

Here’s the simple, straightforward assessment from the deputy head of the China Iron & Steel Association:

“Production cuts are slower than the contraction in demand, therefore oversupply is worsening. Although China has cut interest rates many times recently, steel mills said their funding costs have actually gone up.”

To which we said, “meet the deflationary commodity cycle in all its glory”:

China’s mills — which produce about half of worldwide output — are battling against oversupply and sinking prices as local consumption shrinks for the first time in a generation amid a property-led slowdown. The fallout from the steelmakers’ struggles is hurting iron ore prices and boosting trade tensions as mills seek to sell their surplus overseas.Shanghai Baosteel Group Corp. forecast last week that China’s steel production may eventually shrink 20 percent, matching the experience seen in the U.S. and elsewhere.

“China’s steel demand evaporated at unprecedented speed as the nation’s economic growth slowed,” Zhu said. “As demand quickly contracted, steel mills are lowering prices in competition to get contracts.”

Right. Well actually there’s that, and the fact that they can’t get loans despite multiple RRR cuts and attempts on Beijing’s part to boost China’s credit impulse. In fact, over half the debtors in China’s commodity space are generating so little cash, they can’t even cover their interest payments.

So, considering all of the above, the obvious implication is that China will simply export its deflation…

Given that, it shouldn’t come as any surprise that on Friday, the world’s biggest steelmaker suspended its dividend and cut its outlook.

Here’s more from Bloomberg:

The world’s biggest steelmaker on Friday cut its full-year profit target and suspended its dividend, putting the blame on the flood of cheap steel from China’s loss-making mills. The market is being overwhelmed with material coming from the nation’s state-owned and state-supported producers, a collection of industry associations said Thursday.

“It is obvious that we are operating in a very challenging market,” Chief Financial Officer Aditya Mittal said on a call with reporters. “This is essentially the result of very low export prices out of China that are impacting prices worldwide.”

The steel industry has been roiled by the slowest economic growth in two decades in China, the biggest consumer.

The flood of cheap exports from the nation has drawn complaints from Europe and the U.S. that the shipments are unfair. Bloomberg Intelligence estimates Chinese steel shipments overseas will exceed 100 million metric tons this year, more than the combined output of Europe’s top four producing countries.

While demand for steel in the company’s largest markets of the U.S. and Europe is recovering, producers’ profits are being hit by slumping prices because China has been pushing excess supply onto the world market as its economy slows.

So again, we’re seeing disinflation (the exact opposite of what DM central bankers intended when they decided to expand their balance sheets into the trillions) as global growth and trade enters a new era, characterized by a systemic slump in demand. Here’s the damage in terms of the Arcelor’s equity:

And here’s more from The New York Times on the impact of Chinese “dumping:

“The Chinese are dumping in our core markets,” Mr. Mittal said. “The question is how long the Chinese will continue to export below their cost.”

The company’s loss for the period compared with a $22 million profit for last year’s third quarter.

ArcelorMittal, which is based in Luxembourg, also sharply cut its projection for 2015 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization — the main measure of a steel company’s finances. The new estimate is $5.2 billion to $5.4 billion, down from the previous projection of $6 billion to $7 billion.

On a call with reporters, Aditya Mittal, Mr. Mittal’s son and the company’s chief financial officer, said that a flood of low-price Chinese exports was the biggest challenge for ArcelorMittal in the European and North American markets.

The company estimates that Chinese steel exports this year will reach 110 million metric tons, compared with 94 million tons last year and 63 million tons in 2013. ArcelorMittal produced 93 million metric tons of steel in 2014.

Of course when the standing government policy is to roll over bad debt and avoid SOE defaults at all costs, uneconomic producers can and will continue to produce. This means the deflationary impulse ArcelorMittal cites isn’t likely to dissipate anytime soon, and on that note we close with what we said just a week ago:

The cherry on top is that China itself is now trapped: it simply can’t afford to let anyone default, as one bankruptcy would cascade across the entire bond market and wipe out countless corporations leaving millions of angry Chinese workers unemployed, and is therefore forced to keep bailing out insolvent companies over and over. By doing so, it is adding even more deflationary capacity and even more production into the market, which leads to even lower prices, and even greater bailouts! In short: this is a deflationary toxic spiral.





America: You’ve got three more years to drive normally! – Part 2

5 10 2014

Part 1 of this series stirred up a lot of interest with Rag Blog readers, and it was reposted by Resilience.org where it was also popular. I imagine the article’s somewhat alarming title struck a nerve, calling attention to the repressed fears that challenge our suburban, car-centric American culture. Fears that stem from our culture of denial in response to business as usual.

In Part 2 we will further explore the constraints on our energy resources and will look at the role of finance capital in perpetuating our denial; denial that inhibits energy reform until there is a full blown crisis.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Below are clickable section heads for those of you who like to jump around.
The context of our driving problem
As a nation we know that something is deeply wrong, starting with a politically gridlocked congress. The recent march against climate change underlined this high level of public concern.
Arguably the top issue of our times has become how long our physically expansive system of global finance capital can maintain profitable growth without wrecking the global environment. In this respect, public attention to global warming has become the leading example.
Business as usual justifies its legitimacy by maintaining that at least some plausibly improved version of our system can pay off its immense deficit of public and private debt by growing profitably forever. And can do so in a finite world that is clearly already struggling to deal with a human population of 7 billion. There is now a wealth of solid scientific research and useful information that shows that this goal is impossible; information easily available from a growing assortment of environmental awareness sites like the Post Carbon Institute.
Expansionist economic control and free market fundamentalism have become like a state religion.
Expansionist economic control and free market fundamentalism have become like a state religion uniting politics and economics in support of corporate domination. In accord with this point of view, it comes as no surprise to see Paul Krugman, a liberal Keynesian advocate of a gentler greener kind of capitalist economics, blame the Post Carbon Institute for teaching about natural limits to economic growth.
This recent exchange features Krugman as an economic expansionist, and Richard Heinberg, in response, laying out conflicting positions on the growth issue.  Nobel economics prize winner Krugman seems to have blundered into an uphill debate against top scientists and their intellectual allies.
Now, with the help of recent geological data, we can see that peak oil will probably soon limit and affect an important aspect of American life, namely our driving. The global oil supply situation will probably only permit about three more years of easily affordable driving. So far we have been able mostly to ignore this problem, which has been nipping at our heels for most of the past decade by more than tripling oil prices.
Follow the oil
Oil, when burned, has the unique ability to supply the motive muscle power needed throughout our global civilization. The power to move stuff around; to physically expand global trade by powering nearly all the world’s ships, planes, trucks, and trains. The Hirsch report laid out the difficulty of an economic transition away from oil about a decade ago, by predicting the need for about 20 years to properly prepare for peak oil. Everyone has become fond of solar panels these days, but there has not been nearly enough progress towards alternatives since conventional oil peaked in 2005, given the true scale of the problem.
Peak oil is here, or close enough for us to be able to sketch out important details.
Peak oil is here, or close enough for us to be able to sketch out important details. The current world oil glut is genuine, and we need to try to see why this situation is actually quite compatible with a globally peaking oil supply. We can closely examine the considerable body of evidence that suggests about three more years of easy driving. Anyone can study the same evidence and attempt a more optimistic interpretation.
Thanks to what could be seen as the increasingly disruptive side effects of maintaining our globally oil-dependent economy, we face unpredictable problems that could interfere with normal driving even sooner than three years.
Having made a horrible mess of Iraq, we now see rising conflict throughout the Middle East, largely as a result of an old agreement with the Saudis after the 1970s energy crisis. An agreement to maintain through military force the stable production and export of OPEC oil on the world marketplace. A second looming threat stems from the fact that the global economy was thoroughly disrupted by a severe oil price spike in 2008 and has not recovered. The world of finance capital has been kept solvent since then through transfusions of publicly funded credit, such as quantitative easing and low interest rates.
It is no accident that we sometimes call our dollars petrodollars. The British pound may have been backed by gold, but now our dollar is backed by its singular ability to buy oil and its combustion-derived mobile power on the global market. Oil is only globally traded in dollars, which are also the world’s standard reserve currency.
Our dollar-based global economy, led by finance capital centered in Wall Street and London, has managed to function successfully since WWII, but, distressingly, it is beginning to  resemble an oil-addictive dollar-based global Ponzi scheme, sure to fail without an exponential growth in profit.”
Fracking looks like a fossil fuel retirement party
The technical advance that is keeping the USA driving affordably, for now at least, is hydrofracturing or fracking, used to produce tight gas and oil from shale deposits. This U.S. fracking boom is now adding more than 3 million barrels of tight oil and closely associated liquid condensate fuel each day. This is enough new product that, when it is added to the world’s slowly declining conventional oil production, the resulting in obscuring and delaying the onset of the peak oil problem, if only for a few years.
For the moment, there is a global oil glut and a falling price due to an unusually weak global customer demand for the relatively constant stream of oil being produced and consumed globally, but that does not mean that this product is being produced at a profit. Over the short run, shifting consumer demand due to the economy or freezing weather conditions can have a much bigger faster effect on price than investment in new production, which is slow, and risky at best.
As a whole, domestic oil and gas from fracking is beginning to look like an investment bubble.
As a whole, domestic oil and gas from fracking is beginning to look like an investment bubble. U.S. production of tight oil by fracking can probably only increase and postpone another global oil price spike for a few years. Even if the current fracking boom should somehow give us five more years, it doesn’t change the picture much. Driving will get less affordable because of fuel, and there will be a painfully short amount of time to prepare. Gasoline-powered cars are expensive and last for more than a decade, and the USA doesn’t have any good mobility alternative to serve its suburbs.
An oil glut for now
As we saw in Part 1, trying to convince the U.S. public that they might have a problem driving about three years from now is going to be a hard sell. Who is the driving public to believe, those who warn them about a problem a years from now, or their own eyes? This is especially true since anyone who fills up at the gas pump can see for themselves that gasoline has been getting a bit cheaper lately.
For now, oil and its products remain a buyer’s market. Here we see the Wall Street Journal telling us that the reason that gas prices are going down is because of a glut of gasoline.
A global glut of crude oil is the main driver behind the decline in gasoline prices. Relatively cheap oil has made it more profitable for refiners to produce gasoline and other fuels, and they have ramped up production to record levels. This boom in supplies has sent gasoline prices tumbling. Traders and other market observers expect the flow of both crude oil and gasoline to keep rising, likely exerting more downward pressure on prices.
We are now at the doorstep of globally peaking oil
When I say that Americans will probably have trouble driving in only three years, this means that I think another oil price shock causing widespread public driving anxiety is quite likely by then. It could be less than three years; James Howard Kunstler gives us two years for reasons similar to mine.
Wait until they discover that the shale oil producers have never made a buck producing shale oil, only on the sale of leases and real estate to “greater fools” and creaming off the froth of the complex junk financing deals behind their exertions. Expect that mirage to dissipate in the next 24 months, perhaps sooner if the price of oil keeps sinking toward the sub $90-a-barrel level, where there’s no economically rational reason to bother drilling and fracking.
Gasoline is cheap for now only because oil production is relatively constant and the oil must be sold at whatever price the global market can bear, even during a time of global deflation due to the lingering effect of the 2008 oil price shock.
The estimate of three more years of easily affordable driving is an educated guess, based on looking at the work of a number of expert forecasters and analysts who predict that the global oil market will run out of profitable U.S. fracking plays in about this time. After another oil price spike we’re back to a bad recession like 2009, but this time with even less of the oil needed to recover.
The price of oil has a complex and partly hidden effect on the economy.
The price of oil has a complex and partly hidden effect on the economy. Since cheap conventional oil globally peaked in 2005, the higher price of fuel has acted like a slowly increasing but hidden tax on almost everything sold, since almost everything sold has some rising oil price costs embedded in its sales price. People cut back on discretionary spending in order to pay more for gas, which sent those sectors into recession. A hidden oil tax tends in this way to cause the pervasive economic stagnation we now see.
A rapid oil price spike is a much more politically visible target than the general stagnation effect of high energy prices, since an oil price spike leads to higher fuel and food costs fairly quickly. These two impacts of high oil prices, one faster and one slower, generate different types of political and economic responses.
Without an economic recovery, which is itself unlikely without cheap oil, another gasoline price spike to even $4 dollars a gallon might now cause a broad and angry public demand for Congress to do something fast, a sort of a political tipping point. A return to gasoline rationing, like that used after the 1973 oil crisis, is one plausible way for politicians to try to ease the public’s driving pain.
Expert evidence for three more years of easily affordable driving
The estimate of three years of easily affordable driving depends primarily on estimating how long the current fracking boom, which is now holding down the global oil price, can be sustained. There seems to be almost a consensus, outside of government officialdom like the EIA, of maybe two or three more years.

roger graphic 1

Post Carbon Institute fellow and author Richard Heinberg has written an exceptionally well-researched book, published in July 2013, titledSnake Oil: How Fracking’s False Promise of Plenty Imperils our Future.
In this interview, Heinberg reviews our energy situation; you can get a good idea where things stand just by listening to about the first 10 minutes.  Following is a quote from Heinberg’s recent writing: “Why Peak Oil Refuses to Die. ”
Let’s start with the common assertion that oil supplies are sufficiently abundant so that a peak in production is many years or decades away. Everyone agrees that planet Earth still holds plenty of petroleum or petroleum-like resources: that’s the kernel of truth at the heart of most attempted peak-oil debunkery. However, extracting and delivering those resources at an affordable price is becoming a bigger challenge year by year. For the oil industry, costs of production have rocketed; they’re currently soaring at a rate of about 10 percent annually. Producers need very high oil prices to justify going after the resources that remain—tight oil from source rocks, Arctic oil, ultra-deepwater oil, and bitumen. But oil prices have already risen to the point where many users of petroleum just can’t afford to pay more. The US economy has a habit of responding to oil price hikes by swooning into recession, and during the shift from $20 per barrel oil to $100 per barrel oil (which occurred between 2002 and 2011), the economies of most industrialized countries began to shudder and stall. What would be their response to a sustained oil price of $150 or $200? We may never know: it remains to be seen whether the world can afford to pay what will be required for oil producers to continue wresting liquid hydrocarbons from the ground at current rates.
Heinberg’s shale oil book is partly based on the work of a top Canadian resource geologist, David Hughes, who did a study of tight oil and gas economics for the Post Carbon Institute, titled “Drill Baby Drill.” The report can be downloaded here. Basically what Hughes says is that there are only a few geographically large shale plays which contain within themselves much smaller sweet spots, those areas which are profitable when used to produce fairly high priced oil or gas. But these fracking wells tend to deplete rapidly, and the truly profitable sweet spots are being used up fast, implying that U.S. shale oil production will peak about 2017.
Hughes explained that more than 80 percent of the nation’s shale oil comes from just two plays, the Bakken field in North Dakota and Montana and the Eagle Ford in Texas. He estimates that production in those regions will recede back to 2012 levels in 2019. Overall production across the nation’s shale oil fields will peak in 2017.
Readers who want to review and keep abreast of the evidence should become familiar with the peak oil blogs.
Readers who want to review and keep abreast of the evidence should become familiar with the peak oil blogs. Ron Patterson posts on Peak oil barrel.  Crude Oil Peak  is another excellent source  Yet another is Peak Oil News.
In this article — “US shale oil growth covers up production drop in rest-of-world” — we see charts that tell us that that an increase in U.S. shale oil production is now the one factor that has kept otherwise declining global oil production increasing.  Tight oil has been effectively obscuring the pricing signals that peaking oil in the rest of the world would give, as global oil need, if not ability to buy, continues to rise.
Here is what a top Saudi geologist, now in private practice as a consultant, had to offer in an interview with ASPO-USA earlier this year (“Ex-Saudi Aramco geologist Dr Husseini predicts oil price spikes of USD 140 by 2016-17: graphs”)
Husseini: My base oil price forecast in 2012 dollars still ranges between $105 and $120/barrel Brent with a volatility floor of $ 95/barrel and more probable upward spiking to $140/barrel within 2016/2017.
Dr. Husseini didn’t say how he predicted the oil price spike, but Crude oil Peak analyst Matt Mushalik comments on the Husseini interview. The last graphic predicts that rising demand will meet the falling production predicted by Dr. Husseini about 2016, and concludes as follows:
We see that the intersection point is somewhere in 2016. What is more important than the precise year in which the next oil crunch may happen is the widening gap in the 2nd half of this decade.
Conclusion: Whether the world wants to follow the New Policies Scenario of the IEA WEO 2013 is another question altogether. It seems governments are rather on a current policies track which increases oil demand and therefore pressure on oil prices.
Here is a graphic that illustrates what might happen when fracking declines. See Figure 1.  The red region representing tight oil is the only thing that has kept total world oil production from having already peaked. This is evidence that only a continuation or increase in the current level of U.S. tight oil production from shale can prevent another oil price spike followed by an economic bust.
The Medium Term Oil Market Report of the International Energy Agency (IEA, Paris), published in June 2014, contains a graph which implies that US crude production will start to peak in 2016. Few took notice although the world is continuously occupied with oil and energy related conflicts and wars in Ukraine, Libya and Iraq. So far, oil prices increased only shortly when fights flared up. Apparently oil markets are at ease while the US tight oil “revolution” is underway. But for how long?
The graph [Fig 1: US tight oil and crude oil in rest of world vs oil prices] shows that US tight (shale) oil sits on top of a bumpy crude production plateau in the rest of the world which clearly started in 2005 (average of 73.4 mb/d since Jan 2005). Despite increasing tight oil production oil prices did not go down but stayed at a level of around US$ 100 a barrel. We can safely say that without US tight oil – in May 2014 around 2.9 mb/d – the world would be in a deep oil crisis. People got accustomed to a higher oil consumption level which will be hard to come down from. Between 2005 and 2007, oil production declined by around 2 mb/d (supply shock) and oil prices doubled. That gives us an idea what will happen when tight oil starts to decline. So it is important to know when tight oil reaches its tipping point.
Another prediction that tight oil from fracking will top out in its domestic production in only about three years comes from the U.S. federal government, via the Energy Information Agency (EIA) and its periodic Outlook report.

roger graphic 2

roger graphic 4

See how much difference a year can make in the “reference case” or business as usual expectations, about doubling the expected future output. However if fracking expectations can double in a single year, how accurate is the EIA tight oil production model? How sensitive is the model to oil price? Why not show the model and also show the expected tight oil output for a high, medium, and low oil price? If our future driving affordability is tied to this oil output, we deserve good data transparency.
Here is how top oil analyst Tom Whipple of ASPO-USA reviewing the tight oil production situation recently put it.
The two major forecasting agencies, Washington’s EIA and Paris’ IEA, are both more pessimistic than is generally known for they both foresee US shale oil production levelling off as soon as 2016. The reason for this is that drillers will simply run out of new places to drill and frack new wells. While new techniques of extracting more oil from a well are possible, there is need to look closely at the costs of these techniques vs. the potential payoff.
The shale oil situation in Texas is somewhat different than in North Dakota, for there you have much better weather and two separate shale oil deposits. The recent growth in Texas’s shale oil production has been much smoother than in storm-prone North Dakota and has been increasing at about 44,000 b/d each month. So far as can be seen from the outside of the industry, production in both states will continue to grow for at least another year or two — but then we will be at 2016.
The government has never gotten around to publishing the assumptions that go into the forecast that U.S. shale oil production will stop growing circa 2016. The biggest difference between EIA/IEA and independent analysts is the government forecasters do not see a precipitous drop in shale oil production following the peak. Instead they see a period of flat production followed by a gentle decline stretching well into the next decade. Such a gentle end to the shale oil “bubble” can only assuage fears of a calamity. This projection on a gentle end to U.S. shale oil is at variance with outside forecasters who note that shale oil wells are pretty well gone in three years and simply do not see where the oil to maintain production levels will be coming from for another 10 or 15 years after the peak…
Independent analyses of U.S. shale oil generally come to the same conclusion that production will peak in the 2016-2017 time frame, but as noted above see a much faster decline than does the government.
Hydrofracturing for tight oil and gas is now about all that is left to maintain global oil production
Hydrofracturing for tight oil and gas is now about all that is left to maintain global oil production, as Art Berman points out in this interview: “Shale, the Last Oil and Gas Train”
Oil companies have to make a big deal about shale plays because that is all that is left in the world. Let’s face it: these are truly awful reservoir rocks and that is why we waited until all more attractive opportunities were exhausted before developing them. It is completely unreasonable to expect better performance from bad reservoirs than from better reservoirs. The majors have shown that they cannot replace reserves. They talk about return on capital employed (ROCE) these days instead of reserve replacement and production growth because there is nothing to talk about there. Shale plays are part of the ROCE story–shale wells can be drilled and brought on production fairly quickly and this masks or smooths out the non-productive capital languishing in big projects around the world like Kashagan and Gorgon, which are going sideways whilst eating up billions of dollars. None of this is meant to be negative. I’m all for shale plays but let’s be honest about things, after all! Production from shale is not a revolution; it’s a retirement party. [emphasis mine]
Finally, lets conclude this section with a peak shale oil prediction for 2016 made by one of the most skillful resource data analysts, Jean Laherrere, who along with Colin Campbell coauthored “The End of Cheap Oil” in Scientific American in 1998, when oil cost less than $20 a barrel.  Scroll toward the end of the link and see a big green hump in a chart that represents the official EIA Outlook prediction of a peak in shale oil in 2017. Laherrere’s peak for shale oil is followed by a much steeper decline rate as can be seen in the subsequent chart.

roger graphic 5

As Laherrere says:
It seems that most oil companies are spending more than their revenues by increasing their debts. Countries can live for a long time with huge debt increase, not companies. They count on the stock market by delivering optimistic reports and keep drilling to avoid the production to decline. With shale oil or shale play, in contrary with conventional where wells are dry or producing, oil can be produced even for a while if not economical.
Such behaviour explains why most peak forecasts are wrong. But the main question is about the slope of the decline after the peak. EIA forecast a LTO (light tight oil = shale oil) peak in 2017 it is not too far after my forecast, the big difference is the slow EIA LTO decline.
Why fuel prices probably won’t fall much more
Why won’t the price of driving, as affected by fuel cost, go down very much or for very long? The Saudis alone can produce about 10 million barrels of oil a day mostly for export. This gives the Saudis the ability, acting as one country with a centralized oil production policy, to put a floor under the global oil price simply by cutting back on their oil offered for export. Abundant Saudi oil exports remain vital to a world of commerce built with and quite dependent on affordable oil.
The Saudis lack the excess oil production capacity that they once had, so they cannot flood the market to lower the oil price.
The Saudis lack the excess oil production capacity that they once had, so they cannot flood the market to lower the oil price. However the Saudis still have the critical market power, through cutting production, to keep global crude oil prices from sinking.
“We are swimming in crude, and they [the Saudis] know that better than anyone because they are the biggest exporter,” Mike Wittner, the head of oil market research at Societe Generale in New York, said by phone Sept. 9. “History shows that the Saudis will just do what’s necessary.” … Saudi Arabia made the biggest contribution to OPEC’s production cuts in 2008 and 2009 as demand contracted amid the financial crisis. The group took almost 5 million barrels of daily output off the market, reviving prices from about $30 at the end of 2008 to almost $80 a year later.
At its current price, “Brent has traded since early July within the range of $95 to $110 described as ‘fair’ by Saudi Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi at a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in June.”
The Saudis have an incentive to pump at or near their maximum capacity, but to cut back when the global price sinks below their favored price range, neither so high as to hurt the global economy, nor so low that it puts other higher cost oil producers, which together supply most of the world’s other oil, out of business.
Both Saudi and Iran recently warned that declines in crude prices will be short lived. It is an ominous sign for motorists in the UK who were hoping that recent declines in the cost of a gallon of petrol would be sustained.
The Saudi’s favorable price band is shrinking and may not even exist any more because global oil customers are getting poorer, even while oil producers, especially private oil investors outside the Middle East, are losing money by producing oil under increasingly costly and difficult circumstances.
A timeless pattern of periodic energy investment overshoot
The human effort required to obtain and channel the energy needed to build and maintain an economy is a key feature of all civilizations, which ultimately limits their complexity and type of economic organization, as Tainter has pointed out.  For this reason, changes in the supply and cost of motive power, whether this is derived from oxen and slaves consuming grain or from diesel engines burning oil, can cause civilizations to rise and fall and to win or lose wars.
The oil industry has always been characterized by boom and bust investment cycles.
As a primary and vital source of such power, the oil industry has always been characterized by boom and bust investment cycles, a pattern of exuberant investment in production followed by ruinous periodic production gluts. Frenzied oil production in the giant East Texas field during the early depression years caused the oil price to fall as low as 13 cents a barrel. The Texas governor called out the Texas Rangers to halt and regulate excessive production, which was permanently damaging oil fields.
Later regulation from the Texas Railroad Commission established allowable oil production limits that effectively set world oil prices from the 1930s until the 1960s. This Texas regulation of private producers later served as the regulation model for OPEC, created to prevent ruinous price volatility in the unregulated global oil market.
In Part 1, we saw the federal data compiled by the EIA, which indicates that not only are the top 127 energy companies losing money on oil and gas, but that meanwhile most OPEC oil producing countries are also having trouble meeting their costs by selling oil to a depressed global market.
Deep water oil production in the Gulf of Mexico was expanding fairly rapidly until recently. Since deep water oil is very expensive and risky — and not very profitable — production by the private majors like Exxon, those who can afford $180 million for a deep water well, have been shifting back onshore with the advent of fracking, which is more predictable in outcome and might only cost $8 million per well. Nobody would be doing deep water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico if there were profitable places left to drill on dry land, but now even the deep water drilling has tapered off.
“Deepwater is providing lower returns and has shown no production growth while U.S. unconventionals have much higher returns (at least on paper), [and] enough scale of reserves to be of interest to the majors … so according to them, they will shift spending,” Wicklund noted.
With current economic uncertainty, investors don’t know what the price of oil will be a few years into the life of the well. Until about 2012, the global price of oil was rising nicely, comfortably over $100 a barrel, but over the last two years it has been almost flat and is now decreasing due to a stagnant or deflating global economy.
But oil producers are tied to the existing market price, for better or worse. The market demand for oil-based fuel can rise or fall much faster than the supply tends to change. A low rate of drilling sets the stage for a future price rise when the return of a tight market causes global oil prices to rise again.
Since fracking is what is has been holding U.S. driving costs down, it stands to reason that when this rapidly depleting oil source goes into decline, fuel prices will rise and we will be obliged to drive less.
Military events which could seriously interfere with driving in less than three years
There are looming but plausible threats to widely affordable American driving that are widely understood to exist but are nearly impossible to accurately predict in their severity and timing. Two major “black swan” events are first, an interruption in steady oil exports from the Middle East, and second, a swiftly developing global economic crisis which could affect the U.S. and global economies.
Our current effort to militarily contain the Sunni-based Islamic State in Iraq and deescalate regional conflict is plagued with uncertainties, if not impossibilities. Nobody can easily anticipate how military turmoil in the Sunni regions to the north might affect oil production from the Shiite dominated oil-producing regions of Iraq to the south, which are currently producing and exporting about 3 million barrels of oil a day.
Trying to use U.S. military power to keep the Middle East reliably producing its oil for export has become a daunting military juggling act.
There is much to go wrong in a conflict that could spill over into nearby Saudi Arabia, which is itself increasingly unstable. Trying to use U.S. military power to keep the Middle East reliably producing its oil for export has become a daunting military juggling act.  The new Prime minister of Iraq tells us that all foreign troops will be unwelcome at the same time our generals tell us that the conflict cannot be won from the air.
In light of this situation, we might be better off using diplomacy rather than relying on military power to achieve our goals.
Economic events which could seriously interfere with driving in less than three years
Gasoline has gotten a little cheaper at the pump lately, headed toward $3 a gallon, which has the welcome effect of stimulating the U.S. economy by putting some extra dollars in the pockets of most drivers. But it doesn’t change the big picture much.
The USA remains in an economic crisis because of low growth, a dependence on easy money from the Fed, and an inability to revive the U.S. economy despite a massive level of quantitative easing.

roger graphic 3

roger graphic 6

It is hard not to see that the easy credit and low interest rates are tied to the new public debt shown in Figure 5, and that this cash is seeking out stocks. It looks like the Fed’s quantitative easing is inflating stock prices, which are soaring, but that this cash is avoiding investment in the stagnating economy of high unemployment and minimum wage jobs familiar to those who don’t own stocks. The Nasdaq composite index looks even more peaky. Looking like an asset bubble in search of profitable investment in the self-promoting world of finance, rather than in the struggling hard times economy unable to keep growing without cheap oil. How high will the latest shark tooth get before it falls again?
It is is not widely understood that the great recession of 2008 was initiated when oil surged to $147 a barrel in mid-year, followed by a banking liquidity paralysis and a steep oil price collapse. This same event also tells us roughly what to expect when the current oil glut is succeeded by another oil price spike. Dr James Hamilton has done a lot of economic analysis that strongly links oil price rises to subsequent recessions.
The USA is slowly moving in the right direction, burning less oil and we are driving less than ever, but the easy progress has already been made. We still have to import roughly the same amount of oil that we produce domestically just to keep driving normally. There is essentially one big global oil market which has Americans bidding against the Chinese and everyone else for fuel, in the context of a shrinking supply of globally traded oil.
The Chinese economy now seems to be headed into its own growth slump.
The Chinese economy now seems to be headed into its own growth slump.  For a decade or more, investments in many sorts of raw materials, including oil, have depended on strong Chinese demand that acted as an economic engine to maintain global trade and support rising commodity prices.
…In other words, we are now in a world in which the biggest economy, Europe, is about to enter a triple-dip recession, and the third largest standalone economy, China, is undergoing an economic standstill, and all hopes and prayers are that China will join the ECB in activating monetary easing once again. But yes, the Fed will not only conclude QE but will supposedly begin rising rates in just over two quarters. Good luck with that.
With a global economy depressed for years by the stress of about $100 a barrel oil prices, and with attempts to revive the US. economic growth ineffective, aside from what looks like a stock bubble, we could easily slip into a global deflationary spiral. It is not apparent that the global economy can grow at all without cheap oil. As a result, we have a world flush with dollars that have a very low velocity of circulation and a cautious deflationary spending psychology prevails.
Richard Heinberg’s book The End of Growth pointed out that, with the end of cheap oil, the global economy is likely to be incapable of real material growth, as opposed to financial sector growth.  Good economists are starting to realize that the future doesn’t work very well without cheap oil.
Peak oil could be the catalyst for global collapse. Some see new fossil fuel sources like shale oil, tar sands and coal seam gas as saviours, but the issue is how fast these resources can be extracted, for how long, and at what cost. If they soak up too much capital to extract the fallout would be widespread.
Gail Tverberg in her excellent blog Our Finite World, thinks global deflation is happening now. (“Low Oil Prices: Sign of a Debt Bubble Collapse, Leading to the End of Oil Supply?”)
I would argue that falling commodity prices are bad news. It likely means that the debt bubble which has been holding up the world economy for a very long time — since World War II, at least — is failing to expand sufficiently. If the debt bubble collapses, we will be in huge difficulty…
Tom Whipple, who we saw comment earlier, points out that social and economic problems related to peak oil are already global, and are around us everywhere whether or not we are able to understand the connections.
If we step back and acknowledge that the shale oil phenomenon will be over in a couple of years and that oil production is dropping in the rest of the world, then we have to expect that the remainder of the peak oil story will play out shortly. The impact of shrinking global oil production, which has been on hold for nearly a decade, will appear. Prices will go much higher, this time with lowered expectations that more oil will be produced as prices go higher. The great recession, which has never really gone away for most, will return with renewed vigour and all that it implies…
All this is telling us that the peak oil crisis we have been watching for the last ten years has not gone away, but is turning out to be a more prolonged event than previous believed. Many do not believe that peak oil is really happening as they read daily of surging oil production and falling oil prices. Rarely do they hear that another shoe has yet to drop and that much worse in terms of oil shortages, higher prices and interrupted economic growth is just ahead. We are sitting in the eye of the peak oil crisis and few recognize it. Five years from now, it should be apparent to all.




Australia headed for energy crisis……

12 07 2014

The news coming in regarding Australia’s energy security are getting more and more worrisome.  Add to that the fact we will soon be totally out of oil, and you have to wonder “what next?”.  We are seemingly led by total morons who have no idea what they are doing, consider money to be far more valuable than energy, and in the process are leading this country to rack and ruin…..  How long we have left before all our chickens come home to roost is anyone’s guess, but the mining industry is already starting to sack people (and we haven’t even hit Peak Mining yet..), [official] unemployment is back up to 6%, and it’s high time the people of Australia got rid of the idiots in charge…..

Matt Mushalik

Matt Mushalik

Energy Super Power Australia’s East Coast running low on affordable domestic gas

In July 2006 then Prime Minister Howard declared Australia an energy super power. 2 years earlier his energy white paper set the framework for unlimited gas exports while neglecting to set aside gas for domestic use. It is a bitter irony that at the 10th anniversary of this energy white paper we read that gas shortages in the Eastern market will result in price increases and that there is not even enough cheap gas for gas fired power plants which are supposed to replace dirty coal fired plants or serve as a back-up for renewable power. Wrong decisions a decade ago (or even earlier) now come to the attention of the public as price rises hit the pockets of consumers.

And what has been completely forgotten is that natural gas is the only alternative transport fuel to replace oil. Conventional oil peaked in 2006 (Yes, Prime Minister, under your watch), US shale oil is likely to peak before 2020 and the Middle East is disintegrating in front of our TV eyes faster than energy and transport planners can change their perpetual-growth mindset. An energy equivalent of 5 LNG trains is needed to replace all oil based fuels in Australia. This gas is locked away in long term export contracts. Well done. Les jeux sont faits.

(1)          Recent events

Electricity providers return to coal-fired power as natural gas export revenue soars

3/7/2014
The rising international price of natural gas is causing electricity providers to return to coal-fired power, with Queensland among the first to make the move.

Fig 1: Tarong power station in Queensland

University of Queensland energy analyst Dr Liam Wagner says the rising price will push other power companies to make similar decisions.

“Gas-fired electricity is becoming more expensive; gas in Australia is going to become more expensive with exports,” he said.

“In the future we’re going to have less gas because it’ll be far more expensive to burn it here and the gas producers will be able to make more money overseas.”
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-03/electricity-providers-return-to-coal-fired-power-as-natural-gas/5567252

Nation will be paying the bill for poor energy policy

30/6/2014
The government, unlike other governments around the world, allowed unfettered access to global markets. The building of the export gas terminals will push the prices for gas inexorably up towards world prices. Indeed, wholesale gas prices are widely forecast to more than double to match international prices.

Many in the gas industry are calling for the rapid development of environmentally suspect coal seam gas fields in NSW to counter higher prices. This policy simply will not work as prices on the East Coast are now linked to world prices. No amount of domestic production will change this dynamic.
http://www.smh.com.au/comment/electricity-and-gas-prices-why-youre-paying-more-20140629-zspp1.html

As we can see in the following report, AGL is proud to have connected the domestic market to the Asian market to make quick profits, instead of developing a plan which would use gas domestically in the medium and long-term to maximise economic benefits for the local industry. The quarry mentality continues. The expected shortages are presented as an argument for even more coal seam gas.

AGL raises spectre of gas rationing if gas shortages are not tackled, it tells the NSW Government

17/3/2014
Gas shortages will lead to rationing along with job losses, especially in Sydney’s west, energy utility AGL has warned as it intensifies pressure on the NSW government to allow the development of gas projects in the state that tap gas trapped in coal seams.
http://www.smh.com.au/business/agl-raises-spectre-of-gas-rationing-if-gas-shortages-are-not-tackled-it-tells-the-nsw-government-20140316-34vgr.html

This is the report:

AGL Applied Economic and Policy Research

Solving for ‘x’ – the New South Wales Gas Supply Cliff

March  2014

“During this discovery and appraisal phase, it was evidently clear to resource owners that the east coast gas market was not sufficiently large enough to enable the monetisation of reserves in suitable timeframes and at the scale necessary to maximise profit, and so developing an export market for natural gas in the form of LNG was a logical strategic solution. Not only would it result in the rapid expansion of aggregate demand, but would also have the benefit of linking domestic gas prices, historically ca $3 per gigajoule (/GJ), to the north Asian export market price of ca $6-9/GJ equivalent ex-field ‘netback price’ over the medium term(p 2)

“On Australia’s east coast over the period 2013-2016, we forecast that aggregate demand for natural gas will increase three-fold, from 700 PJ to 2,100 PJ per annum, while our forecast of system coincident peak demand increases 2.4 times, from 2,790 TJ to 6,690 TJ per day. This extraordinary growth is being driven by the development of three Liquefied Natural Gas plants at Gladstone, Queensland”.  (p 1)

“Almost simultaneously, a non-trivial quantity of existing domestic gas contracts currently supplying NSW will mature. Much of that gas has been recontracted to LNG producers in Queensland – thus creating a gas supply cliff in NSW. Compounding matters, recent policy developments have placed binding constraints over the development of new gas supplies in NSW”(p 1)

Fig 3: NSW gas supply cliff lead to price increases

http://aglblog.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/No.40-Solving-for-X-FINAL.pdf

These developments are a bitter irony given that the public has been told many times that Australia’s gas resources are abundant. All LNG export contracts were presented as great achievements.

(2)  Wrong decisions 12 years ago

Although LNG exports to Japan had started in 1989 (20 years contracts with 8 power and utility companies signed in 1985), the 2002 LNG deal with China was Howard’s first main contribution towards a poor energy policy.

Australia Wins China LNG Contract

8/8/2002
John Howard: “I am delighted to announce that today I have been advised by the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji that Australia’s Northwest Shelf Venture has been chosen by China to be the sole supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to its first LNG project in Guangdong province.”
http://australianpolitics.com/news/2002/08/02-08-08.shtml

5 months earlier, John Akehurst, Woodside’s Managing Director, warned in a report with mixed messages:

Mar 2002

Challenges for Australia

Australia has large gas reserves which have the potential to meet a much larger proportion of Australia’s energy requirements, including liquid petroleum requirements (via CNG, LNG, Gas to Liquids). Gas for oil substitution would deliver significant greenhouse benefits and help Australia meet its Kyoto target. Increased LNG exports would partly offset the cost of rising liquids imports and help address their impact on the balance of payments.  (p 8 )

However, greater use of gas will require substantially more investment in gas production and pipeline infrastructure. Without such investment, south eastern Australian gas markets will, within a few years, face possible gas shortages. Major consumers will find it more difficult to secure long term supply contracts on sufficiently competitive terms (p 9)

Fig 4: Superimposition Akehurst forecast with actual production

LNG export projects and gas-based value adding projects are needed to underpin the cost of bringing new gas supply sources to shore and to justify the initial investment. These types of projects compete on world markets (primarily with projects in Asia) and the provision of an internationally competitive investment environment including fiscal terms is a key driver. (p 10)
www.aspo-australia.org.au/References/Akehurst%20ABARE%202002.pdf

Of course one cannot have it both ways. To replace petrol and diesel in Australia one would need the energy equivalent of 5 LNG trains.

(3)          Howard’s flawed Energy White Paper June 2004

Fig 5: excerpt from Howard’s June 2004 energy white paper

This white paper just rationalises decisions already made earlier by formulating following policy principles  (p 53)

  • Commercial decisions should determine the nature and timing of energy resource developments, with government interventions being transparent and allowing commercial interests to seek least-cost solutions to government objectives (e.g. environment, safety or good resource management objectives).
  • Government objectives should generally be driven by sector-wide policy mechanisms rather than impose inconsistent requirements on individual projects/private investors.

And on page 128:

Australia’s gas reserves are sufficient for more than 100 years at current production levels, or more than 200 years of current domestic consumption. Furthermore, prospects for finding and proving up more gas are good, subject to finding markets. However, the location of Australia’s major gas reserves—to the north and north-west —compared with major demand locations—to the south-east—is sometimes raised as an issue (see Figure 6 and 3 in Chapter 2—Developing Australia’s Energy Resources).”

Note the term “At current production levels” which of course is irrelevant when LNG exports are doubled or tripled.

Fig 6: Map of oil and gas resources in the EWP 2004

Fig 7: Map of gas pipelines in EWP 2004

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/10052/20050221-0000/www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/energy_future/docs/energy.pdf

The Geoscience Report “Oil and Gas Resources in Australia 2004 writes: Natural gas has a current “life” estimated at 65 years, but past estimates have been as low as 39 years (in 1993) and as high as 76 years (in 2001). These estimates include all resources and production in the JPDA with Timor-Leste.”

Fig 8: Geoscience Australia’s reserve to production ratios

http://www.ga.gov.au/image_cache/GA8550.pdf

The EWP 2004 continues to argue:

“Predictions are made that supplies of gas to major urban markets will run short in the next decade, as production in the Cooper Basin and Bass Strait declines. This has resulted in calls for financial support towards the building of major pipelines from either the Northern Territory (to access gas from Sunrise and other Timor Sea fields), Papua New Guinea or north-west Australia (to access gas from either Carnarvon or Browse Basins). While reserves of gas in existing fields close to southeast markets are declining, this does not represent an energy security concern.

Exploration is occurring in the south-east and is resulting in new discoveries and development, such as in the Otway Basin. The development of coal seam methane is also increasing supplies of gas in the region. In addition, holders of the large remotely located gas reserves are actively seeking markets to monetise these reserves. These efforts include actively investigating pipeline projects for bringing supplies of gas from north and north-west sources, as well as seeking LNG export sales in Asian markets. The number and activity of these competing proposals provide a degree of confidence that these supplies will become available once economic, noting that this will in all likelihood occur at higher price levels than those currently enjoyed in some south-eastern markets.

Given the size and placement of gas reserves relative to current and future gas demand, gas supply is not likely to become an issue for the short to medium term. Pre-empting market outcomes in these circumstances is unlikely to add significantly to energy security, but could inflict significant costs by precluding less costly options (such as further development of the Gippsland and Otway basins or coal seam methane).”

http://www.efa.com.au/Library/CthEnergyWhitePaper.pdf

The task of building North/West-East gas pipelines was not pro-actively followed up by State and Federal governments but dropped altogether in favour of exports. No wonder this laissez-faire approach went wrong.

CO2 emissions

The EWP 2004 argues:

“The shape of future international action on climate change is unclear, but the potential costs of future adjustments and long life of energy assets makes it prudent to prepare for the future.” ( p 131)

LNG development could increase Australia’s energy emissions by around 1 per cent of energy sector emissions. However, to the extent that exported Australian gas replaces more greenhouse intensive energy in the importing country, global emissions may decrease as a result of Australian gas production  (p 137)

This is just an argument in favour of LNG exports while none of the LNG contracts included a clause that coal fired power plants equivalent to the energy content of the gas should be decommissioned in the destination country. The above example of Queensland going back to coal shows that not even in Australia the job of using gas to reduce emissions is taken seriously.

(4) Energy super power declared in 2006

17/7/2006
The Prime Minister has outlined his vision for energy and water, saying the nation has the makings of an energy superpower.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2006-07-17/howard-outlines-energy-superpower-vision/1803744

(5) Actual gas production

Let’s have a look at gas production statistics

Fig 9: Australia’s gas production 1977-2013

 Data are from APPEA: http://www.appea.com.au/?attachment_id=5192

We see peak gas in the Cooper basin between 1999 and 2002 at around 260 bcf. Right at that peak, Howard failed to pursue building a gas pipeline to connect Western offshore gas with Eastern gas markets.  While LNG exports on the West coast surged, the East coast remained on a bumpy production plateau.  Western Australia has a 15% Domgas policy but also did not introduce gas as a transport fuel. As WA’s LNG gas goes out the window, Queensland and NSW are forced to go for environmentally questionable coal seam gas.

Fig 10: Australia’s LNG exports

The first 3 trains (2.5 mt pa each) mainly supply Japanese utilities, while the Guangdong contract (3.3 mt pa over 25 years) required train 4 (4.4 mt pa)

(6) Conventional gas depletion in NSW, Victoria and South Australia

The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) estimates in its Gas Statement of Opportunities 2013 that current conventional 2P reserves would be depleted by the mid of the next decade.

Fig 10: Depletion of conventional gas reserves (2P) in the South East

“Under the modelled production-cost conditions, consumption of Denison Trough 2P reserves occurs first in 2019. Consumption of Otway Basin 2P reserves begins in 2020, and it is completely consumed by 2023. Bass and Cooper basin conventional 2P reserves are consumed in 2025. Gippsland 2P reserves are consumed in 2026. The 2P CSG reserves in Queensland are sufficient to supply demand until the end of the 20-year outlook period.”

Fig 11: Gas shortfalls in the South East

 “Additional 3P reserves and 2C resources are available in the Otway, Bass, Gippsland, and Cooper basins. The 3P/2C reserves in the Bass, Gippsland, and Cooper basins are sufficient to ensure supply until the end of the 20-year outlook period, provided current transmission and production limitations remain unchanged. The 3P/2C reserves in the Otway Basin are only sufficient to ensure supply until 2028 or 2029, depending on the level of support the southern states receive from production in the north.

Given its role in supplying demand in Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney, the Otway Basin reserves consumption is a significant event, with substantial infrastructure investment required to manage changing system flows.”

http://www.aemo.com.au/Gas/Planning/Gas-Statement-of-Opportunities

(7) Domgas Alliance report

Australia Domestic Gas Policy Report (Nov 2012)

History has proven that countries with large resource endowment do not automatically gain an economic competitive advantage over countries that do not have such surplus endowment of resources. Exporting countries have to take the necessary precautions to avoid what are known to economists as the Natural Resource Curse and Dutch Disease. Australia’s large LNG export boom, that is well underway, has the capacity to trigger both of these symptoms and the subsequent regrets.

Gas resource rich countries rely on a comprehensive menu of interventions and gas regulations and policies in order to protect the national interest and the best interest of the general public regarding the use of indigenous gas production. Benchmarking illustrates that Australia does not manage its gas resources adequately to ensure that gas explorers and production companies operate in a manner that is consistent with a vibrant domestic gas market.

Gas resource rich countries, regions and continents generally export gas only after they first develop their own domestic gas market into a vibrant one that has very high gas consumption rates per capita and a high gas penetration in the total primary energy supply. To do otherwise destroys value and effectively de-industrialises the exporting region.

Australia needs to have sufficiently comprehensive policies and regulations in place in order to control and manage the export of raw commodities. Simply relying on market forces without comprehensive guidelines and controls to mitigate inequitable market power is one extreme while nationalising all resources is the other extreme. Neither of these scenarios has proven to serve the public interest very well.

http://www.domgas.com.au/pdf/Media_releases/2012/Australia%20Domestic%20Gas%20Policy%20Final%20Report.pdf

(8) Gas price outlook

The following graph from the Eastern Australian Domestic Gas Market Study by BREE, Department of Industry, shows Energy Quest’s doubling of gas prices by the end of this decade.

Fig 12: Gas prices will double

http://www.industry.gov.au/Energy/EnergyMarkets/Documents/EasternAustralianDomesticGasMarketStudy.pdf

Summary:

Decisions on excessive LNG exports have been made more than 10 years ago and are irreversible. They continued ever since – irrespective of which State or Federal governments were in power –and will lead to yet more LNG exports.  Consumers will have to pay higher gas prices for having elected these governments.  Another regret will come in the next years when it becomes clear that gas is needed as transport fuel.

Fig 13: Glimpse into the future: truckies protest drive around  Canberra’s Capital Hill

Previous articles on this website on gas

9/5/2012    Queensland plans to export more than 10 times the gas NSW needs (part 3)
http://crudeoilpeak.info/queensland-plans-to-export-more-than-10-times-the-gas-nsw-needs-part-3

6/5/2012   Howard’s wrong decisions on offshore gas exports start to hit transport sector now
http://crudeoilpeak.info/howards-wrong-decisions-on-offshore-gas-exports-start-to-hit-transport-sector-now

13/10/2011    NSW gas as transport fuel. Where are the plans?
http://crudeoilpeak.info/nsw-gas-as-transport-fuel-where-are-the-plans

11/10/2011   Australia’s natural gas squandered in LNG exports
http://crudeoilpeak.info/australias-natural-gas-squandered-in-lng-exports





The beginning of the end

12 02 2014

If you are an Australian, you will be well aware that we will no longer be making cars in this country within three years.  If you are reading this from somewhere else in the world….. pay attention!

The media here is falling over itself asking why this is happening.  Every darn reason is churned over, and over, and over.  Political points are being scored left right and centre.  It’s their fault….  NO, it’s your fault……  or it’s the high dollar, or it’s the unions, or the lack of tariffs, or maybe they were just building the wrong cars and the Australian market didn’t want those cars……  and our Prime Moronster is taking a hit (which is good..), but really, the two parties that have been in power for the past hundred years or more have little to do with what’s happening here.  The fact they don’t seem to know what is really going on is very worrying.  The lights are on, but nobody’s home……

Holden’s demise was sealed in 2009.  When the financial crisis, triggered by high oil prices, the very same year that saw the US government force GM as a condition of its bail-out to dump the Pontiac brand, for which Holden’s Commodore SS was planned to play a major role, our export car market hit the wall….  Worse, local production of its supposedly fuel efficient (7.4/100km – no bone shaker here) Cruze came too late. So we have peak oil ignorance being all the way to the very end – without any chance for a transition to an EV of sorts…..
Then we have the Conversation publishing an article stating “it’s generally accepted, the car industry is a cr

Matt Mushalik

Matt Mushalik

itical part of Australia’s science and technology base. The sector spends A$600 million a year on R&D and another $800 million on buying inputs from the computing, engineering and consulting industry. So it’s a major producer and user of knowledge.”  Really…?  Where’s the innovation in any Australian car?  My 17 year old Citroen has better suspension technology that any Commodore, and it’s able to produce better fuel efficiency than a Cruze….  Even Toyota’s hybrid Camry is…..  well, just a hybrid!

Personally, I think Matt Mushalik hit the nail on the head with the following charts…..
 

Holden’s problems started more than 10 years ago
The perfect storm had come much earlier than a high Australian dollar which went above earlier 1990 levels of 75 US cents only after 2007
Underlying graph from:  http://www.alankohler.com.au/
It was high oil prices which started to exceed permanently the $20 a barrel level in 2002:
That changed the whole car market for good:
Charts which of course leave out the still popular Four Wheel Drive Toorak Tractors……  Somebody must have more money than me, the $100 it costs to fill either of our cars is a significant budgetary impost in this household…
There are eye popping stats in Matt Mushalik’s article….  like the fact 42% of all the cars we exported went to….. Saudi Arabia, the land of the cheapest petrol!
Holden’s research consistently shows that consumers do not value improved fuel efficiency highly. At least in a relative sense, fuel efficiency ranks relatively low when compared to other vehicle attributes such as performance, towing capacity, features and safety. This can be attributed in the main to the relatively low cost of fuel in Australia, and it appears unlikely that this will change in the short to medium term. What it means in practical terms is that if we are required to incorporate new technologies into our vehicles that the consumer does not value, we will obviously not be in a position to recover the cost of those technologies in the price of the vehicles. Ultimately, this will have the effect of rendering our vehicles less competitive in the marketplace” (p 44 http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/auto)
And talk of wrong ideas……:

(3.2.1) Holden submission May 2002
Holden made following main points in relation to fuel costs, efficiencies and  commercial production thresholds:
  • In terms of technological change alone, the automotive industry is on the brink of a major shift as we make the transition from internal combustion engines to fuel cells. (p 10)

Fuel Cells?  Well, it was 11 or 12 years ago, but it’s evident today that virtually nobody is still pursuing fuel cells to power cars, most R&D is now in electric vehicles with batteries.

Mushalik concludes with:

The Holden history tells us that wrong decisions were done 10-15 years ago. The 2005 Hirsch report to the US Department of Energy warned it would take 10-20 years to prepare for peak oil. This time has been wasted by Australian governments and the car industry by continuing what was essentially business-as-usual. The unexpected US shale oil boom resulted in global crude production in 2013 getting higher than 2005 but this did not reduce oil prices – although it might have helped to stop oil prices from skyrocketing beyond experience.
 
If you think that lessons have been learned for other oil-dependent sectors of the economy you’ll be disappointed. The equivalent of the love affair with big cars and 3 litre engines is the continuing push of governments for additional highways, toll-ways and road tunnels instead of electric rail development.
I’m still waiting on the final Australian Oil Production figures for 2013 to be published by BREE to update my yearly posts on our end of oil crisis….  watch this space.  In the meantime, Shell has announced it is totally pulling out of Australia.  Everything.  Service Stations and refineries, the lot.  Now exactly why would they do this…..?